As for the present, all the same data that show a major decline in U.S. and Iraqi casualties since last summer also show that the reduction of casualties has now plateaued and may be rising. Al Qaeda and the extreme elements of the JAM have every incentive to find ways to raise the U.S. casualties between now and November, and will be seeking ways to use bombings to raise the rate and number. These attacks may be far more important over the months to come than the 4,000 figure.
There is a great deal of talk about the ultimate future dollar cost of the war if we stay. Much of this discussion somewhat unrealistically assumes that the dollar cost of fighting and aid remains relatively constant. In practice, success in moving to strategic overwatch and shifting the burden to the ISF and Iraqi government expenditures would actually sharply reduce the out year dollar costs. The same is true of the longer term trends in killing and wounded.
But, if we are in Iraq through the end of the next administration, the real benchmark may still be more than 5,000 killed and 15,000-20,000 more wounded before the costs in blood are over.
In short, there is no easy way to describe the meaning of 4,000 dead. We cannot credibly yet predict the future, or talk of whether or not their sacrifice will have strategic meaning. We cannot divorce that sacrifice from the sacrifice of the living, and we cannot predict the future cost in blood any more than we can predict the cost in dollars. About all we can be certain of is that the kinds of clear cut predictions that emerge from the polarized political debate over the war describe both a defeat and a victory that do not yet exist.