Powell: The question was, did they have stockpiles or not? And we all thought they had stockpiles, not because we wished it. The evidence suggested that they had stockpiles. The U.N.'s own data over a period of 12 years suggested they had stockpiles. They hadn't answered questions with respect to materials we knew they had, but we don't know what happened to that material, and they wouldn't tell us. So the presumption was, and the evidence was, that they had stockpiles of these weapons, particularly chemical weapons. And so we are now examining that more closely under the leadership of Charlie Duelfer, who took over from Dr. Kay. Dr. Kay went in thinking that there were stockpiles. He came out saying, I don't think there are stockpiles now. And so we may not find the stockpiles. They may not exist any longer. But let's not suggest that somehow we knew this. We went to the United Nations, we went to the world with the best information we had — nothing that was cooked. I spent a great deal of time out at the CIA with Director Tenet and Deputy Director John McLaughlin and all of their experts, going over that presentation. And it reflected the view of the intelligence community, the United Kingdom's intelligence community, [the] intelligence community of many other nations. And it was consistent with reporting from the United Nations over time. And so we had solid basis for the information we presented to the president, the intelligence community presented to the president, and for the decisions that the president made.