SHELTON: I don't believe it's being outsourced too much, and I do believe that we need better controls over the contractors that are out in the field. But certainly when you look at the nation building aspect of the mission that we have in Afghanistan, as an example, those requirements far exceed what the military has the capability to do. And so, if you want those things done, you have to either go to contractors or the other elements of our government -- Commerce, Justice Department et cetera. They have to be able to come in and work those issues, because the military can't get there from here. So (inaudible) controls.
AMANPOUR: Let's go back to when you were chairman of the Joint Chiefs and even slightly afterwards, when President Bush decided to go to war in Iraq. You talk about it was based on faulty intelligence and indeed on lies and deceit, but you also say something about insubordination. You say, for instance, during meetings, "some people were kept on after Bush had tendered his opinion and issued an instruction based on that opinion. Yet certain strong-willed individuals seemed to disregard him and forge ahead with their own agendas, almost to the point of insubordination." That's a very strong indictment.
SHELTON: Well, there was a very strong push in those days for us to go into Iraq, and there was absolutely no intelligence, zero, that pointed toward -- pointed toward the Iraqis. It was all Al Qaida, Osama bin Laden. And yet there was an element there that was -- that was pushing to go into Iraq at the same time.
AMANPOUR: But what do you mean by insubordination?
SHELTON: The fact that the president says himself, we're not going to do that right now, let's focus on Afghanistan, the Taliban and Al Qaida. Yet below the surface, we still had the sentiment (ph) that said, let's keep planning for Iraq just in case we can convince him that we can go.
AMANPOUR: And you think they could have convinced him?
SHELTON: Not at that time. I think that, as President Bush told me at Camp David, you know, I just don't see it. You know, we may go get Saddam and take him out, but it will be at a time and place of our choosing. It won't be as a part of the Afghanistan operation. He got it from day one...
AMANPOUR: So you're saying he was pushed into it?
SHELTON: I think eventually that that same drumbeat continued, and Afghanistan, remember, was going very, very well. The drumbeat back here in Washington was still pushing, coming out of the Pentagon, let's go to Iraq, let's get -- take him out. And he finally said, let's go. We walked out on the limb before we could build a coalition of the -- either the United Nations or NATO, one of the two.
AMANPOUR: You're very -- you have some harsh words about then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. Is he part of the group that you are targeting here?
SHELTON: Well, I personally like Secretary Rumsfeld, but he was part of the group, he and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, that continued to push to go into Iraq. And I think that's been documented on a number of occasions.
AMANPOUR: But you also say that in terms of dealing with defense secretaries that Secretary Rumsfeld was more in the (INAUDIBLE) mold, which you said was, you know, based more on sort of heavy pushing and on those kinds of relationships.