Is Bob Gates Leaning Towards a Troop Surge? Sure Seems Like It

ABC News' Martha Raddatz reports:

According to a U.S. official, the White House meetings on the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy are beginning to change from the questions and answers and “structured conversations,”  to “the point where people are showing their cards.” 

Yes, a lot still has to happen. Gen. Stanley McChrystal still is going to make a personal appearance (probably the last week of October) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff might also be called in, leaving the final decision until probably the first week of November.

But from my vantage point, the tea leaves are getting much easier to read in the mug marked "secretary of defense."

It would be hard to argue that there is anyone with a more influential voice in this process of deliberating troop increases and strategy than Defense Secretary Bob Gates. President Obama deeply respects him, and as the civilian authority at the Pentagon his opinion resonates not only with civilians but the military. In short, it would be awfully hard for the president to go against the advice of his secretary of defense and his military commanders.  There is no bigger one-two punch than the military and civilian power at the Pentagon. 

While Gates has not said flat out that he is supporting McChrystal’s request for additional troops he appears to be leaving a trail of breadcrumbs that lead to that conclusion.

In the months building up to President Obama’s decision to rethink his strategy, Gates expressed hesitation about adding new troops, fearing the footprint of occupation.  But if you look at his most recent statements, including those  on "This Week With George Stephanopoulos" and in interviews with CNN's Christiane Amanpour and John King, he seems to be debunking his own arguments from months ago.

On everything including the footprint, his support for McChrystal, his feelings about the momentum being with the Taliban, the symbiosis between the Taliban and al Qaeda, and his strong support of counterinsurgency operations over the years, it seems pretty clear that he is not siding with Vice President Joe Biden.  It appears that Gates is hiding his inclination towards adding more troops in plain sight.

Here are a few examples. I think you will see what I mean:

On “This Week,” defining victory:

GATES: I think we know it when we see it, and we see it in Iraq.  I think that success in Afghanistan looks a great deal like success in Iraq in this respect – that the Afghan national security forces increasingly take the lead in protecting their own territory and going after the insurgents and protecting their own people.  We withdraw to an over-watch situation and then we withdraw altogether.

STEPHANOPOULOS: Which first required a surge in Iraq.

GATES: It did require the surge.  And that's the issue that we will be looking at over the next several weeks, the next couple of weeks or so, is: 'Do we have the right strategy?' And that includes the question of … 'Is McChrystal's approach, in the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Command commander, the right approach?'  And if so, then what would be the additional resources required?

On Amanpour:

GATES: There’s no question in my mind that if the Taliban took large – took control of significant portions of Afghanistan, that that would be added space for al Qaeda to strengthen itself and more recruitment, more fundraising.  But what’s more important than that, in my view, is the message that it sends that empowers al Qaeda.  Al Qaeda, in many respects, is an ideology.

GATES: All I will say is, first of all, I think Stan McChrystal is exactly the right person to be the commander in Afghanistan right now.  He was my recommendation to the president to lead this effort, and I have every confidence that no matter what decision the president makes, Stan McChrystal will implement it as effectively as possible.

On John King:

GATES: So I think that the notion of timelines and exit strategies and so on, frankly, I think, would all be a strategic mistake. The reality is failure in Afghanistan would be a huge setback for the United States. Taliban and al Qaida, as far as they're concerned, defeated one superpower. For them to be seen to defeat a second, I think, would have catastrophic consequences in terms of energizing the extremist movement, al Qaeda recruitment, operations, fundraising and so on. I think it would be a huge setback for the United States. I think what we need is a strategy that we think can be successful and then to pursue it, and pursue it with confidence and resolution.

KING: You mentioned the history, and you're a student of history, and you're on the record talking about how this did become a quagmire for the Soviets, who had about 120,000 troops in Afghanistan. And you have said many times the Afghan people began to view them as occupiers, not as friends. Where's the line for the United States so that you don't cross that very same line?

GATES: Well, I think the analogy of the situation with the Soviets really doesn't hold. The Soviets' presence in Afghanistan was condemned by virtually every country in the world. They conducted a war of terror against the Afghans. They probably killed one million Afghans, made five million of them into refugees, tried to impose an alien social and cultural change on the country.  So the situations are completely different. And I think that the … Afghans continue to see us as their ally and partner.