New GM CEO Mary Barra Apologizes on Capitol Hill

General Motors under fire for not addressing faulty ignition switch.
3:00 | 04/01/14

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Transcript for New GM CEO Mary Barra Apologizes on Capitol Hill
This is a special group. I'm Michelle Franzen in New York with this ABC news digital special report in the hot seat today General Motors CEO Mary Barra. Expected to walk in Washington on an apology tour now testifying. In just moments on Capitol Hill about the company's actions or lack thereof in the face of concerns about faulty ignition switches. Those switches would turn off all power of the car air bags while they were on -- the company concedes that the safety flaw played a role in at least. Thirteen deaths now families and lawmakers want answers to why it took GM nearly a decade to formally address the issue. ABC's Karen Travers has been following this story and has the latest now from Washington. This morning on Capitol Hill lawmakers and victims' families demanded answers from General Motors. Laura Christian sixteen year old daughter amber Marie Rhodes died in this 2005 crash in Maryland involving a Chevy cobalt. Our daughters. Sons are gone. Because they -- -- cost of doing business GM's style. They -- the auto maker needs to come clean why it took more than a decade to address a problem with defective ignition switches. Samantha -- was -- the lucky ones who survived. Driving his car was likely little game of Russian -- on Capitol Hill today the new CEO -- General Motors and beyond not hot seat. Since Mary -- took over in January General Motors has were called two point six million vehicles because there ignition switches could turn not unexpectedly. Shutting down the car -- safety systems including the airbag. GM made. A business decision. To hide. -- -- that not only to avoid repairing it. But to conceal. Last night bar that was some of the victims' families here in Washington. Windy rain makers fifteen year old daughter Amy -- was killed in this horrific crash in Wisconsin in 2006. She was riding -- the Chevy cobalt with a faulty ignition. Said she was storied all of us. And and then we all got a chance to talk Darren Keller -- -- -- our children. And another bloated General Motors yesterday the auto maker announced another one point three million cars are being recalled due to problems with the power steering. Karen Travers ABC news Washington. Now for more on the ignition problem the recall and the aftermath I want to bring in editor in chief of car driver Eddie Alterman and Ann Arbor, Michigan. Andy thank you for joining us a short time ago we watched CEO Mary -- she's walked into the room. The problems with these vehicles started nearly ten years ago why did it take so long for General Motors to react. Well that's one of the things that the committee is gonna try to find out today you know was this. Just sloppy bureaucracy big corporation and -- or was this will police -- was this cover up that's for what they're gonna try to figure out. And -- and there are now six point three million cars recalled by GM this month. This many recalls such a short amount of time -- -- is that in the car industry here. It's very unusual and it rivals the -- Firestone recall which -- I think. Seven point four million vehicles -- four for big -- and I think this says. General -- trying to make as good as possible -- -- -- these revelations. And -- you know the national highway traffic safety administration of course the regulatory agency here did look into the problem the didn't demand a recall. Give us an idea of why that didn't happen. Well there are thirteen fatalities. You showed you can argue they shouldn't look a little bit harder. This is very much a needle in the haystack I think. They were probably assume -- certain minimum level totality as well thirteen. That they followed with these cars and so. You're sort of looking at well why didn't why -- these things happen and I think it probably -- looked -- -- her spirit it has. I don't know that fits into their statistical calculation which is a very very kind of callous and and tough thing to say but that's how. That's how regulators and that's -- car companies look at these pro. No homes or nearly a decade into -- now of course a lot of hindsight how hard do these companies fight against potential recalls. Police -- cost money and -- -- do these calculations to find out you know if if they can save more money doing to recall is not doing and you know -- an unfortunate. Aspect. This business I'm so nobody wants it to issue a recall -- it excellent reputation can't. There also these kind of more quiet recalls -- You know TSB's. Service bulletins. Two when people come into the dealership into it kind of -- quietly fix. Some of these issues but recalls being deal. In the call that recalls will cost GM an estimated 750. Million dollars that doesn't count any new settlements they'll have to pay. It also got a new sort of recall. That's also been issued as their potential this could damage the company only recently bouncing back from the brink. Yes going to be expensive business number two is about -- we'll see literally finally isn't this is gonna stretch comforter -- time cost a lot of money. And just at the track. Tackle issues here a lot of cars and have been recalled or not even manufactured -- -- -- going to be a problem in finding parts for these cars. Explain the process for people who need need those new parks. You know -- you'll have to go back to the viewer and get it installed you'll have to beat. You know official GM service I think -- to make sure that. Next. All the t.s are crossed. -- -- get an idea just -- -- -- your time of covering these stories where does this put the industry. GM's a big big company a big giant. She had that you had a ton of momentum -- on strengthen -- great products from past years and coming out of bankruptcy with. The wind at their back. This is a very very tough trial for Mary -- This is her first. Big trial and it ends a huge one as the new CEO. But I think she represents. Friendly interface -- General Motors -- not a monolith it. Big corporation and I think people try to portray and asked. This is a collection of people who care deeply about the proxy create. And I think she's. A very very -- faces. Eddie Alterman with car driver thank you very much for joining us we want to go now to the hearing where CEO of GM is being -- Asked questions like Tim -- with Sharon and certainly you know let's -- -- I think there are witnesses for being so responsive. To the up. Committee's staff requests. We are here to re examine a very important matter the hearing -- a appropriately named we do have questions for General Motors. We have questions for the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Two chances to open up formal went investigations. Into the recalled -- hormone which cars boats and 20072000. -- -- and initially examined problems with the vehicles and both times both times decided that no investigation was needed. We need to hear from its at today how you intend to -- improve the process going forward and we were just here five years ago with the Toyota investigation. He heard a lot of things out of its on those hearings. I'd like to know how they have improved the process and how we can expect to have confidence in their ability going forward -- you'll. Back americanized the ranking member of the committee ms. degette of Colorado. You very much mr. chairmen like all of us I'm deeply troubled. About what our investigation has revealed about GM's business practices and its commitment to safety. Here's what we now. We now that GM has recalled over 2.5 million vehicles because it defective ignition switches. We know they should have done it much much earlier. We know that GM failed to provide thank -- federal regulators with key information. And sadly we know that at least thirteen people are dad. And there have been dozens of crashes because GM produced cars that had a deadly fact. Mr. chairman I have a copy of the mission switch assembly for one -- -- costs. And this is that. -- spring inside the sweats. A piece that cost pennies. Failed to provide enough force causing the switch to turn off when the car -- over Bob. GM knew about this problem in 2000 and -- They were warned again and again over the next decade but they did nothing and I just want to show how easy Ed Ed. To turn this key and then switch. If you had a heavy key chain like my mom key chain. Or if you had if you are short and you bumped up against the ignition. Which -- -- It could -- this week to switch right off. Mr. chairman we now know that these switches were defective from the start. In February of 2002 -- GM's ignition switch supplier Delphi. Informed the company that the switch did not meet GM's minimum specifications. But GM approved it anyway. Now yesterday we -- -- -- a letter about this decision. I'd like unanimous consent to make that latter part of the hearing record without him soon after this approval the defective cars were on the -- And it didn't take long for problems to appear. In 2003. June 2003. The owner of -- Saturn ION with 33474. Miles on the odometer. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- I'm think he and the car shut off. GM would receive more than a 130 similar warranty claims true owners about this problem over the next decade. But it never informed the public or reported the problem to federal safety regulators. The minority staff conducted this -- analysis -- again. We prepared a memo about these claims I'd also ask unanimous consent to put that -- the record mr. chairman without objection. Initially. GM opened multiple investigations into the ignition switch issue. Each which concluded the switch was bad it didn't meet the -- -- and 2005. GM identified solutions to the problem that concluded that clout the two cooling costs and peace price are too high. That's. None of the solutions represents. And acceptable business case. Documents provided by GM shot out that this unacceptable cost increase was only 57. Cents. Mr. chairman. We have this document that we got from GM somehow it's not in the -- I'd ask you net unanimous consent to put this in -- in the record without objection so ordered. Another technical investigation completed in 2005. Led GM to issue a technical service bulletin advising dealers to distribute he -- to help reduce the problem. This is a simple fix to reduce the force on the -- to mister chairman. These are the keys of one of my staff members. Who actually owns one of these cars an issue concede. Their cell line. Lying insert. What -- key inserts were supposed to do is go in the middle and just create a little hole so -- key and the keys wouldn't go back and forth. Unfortunately. GM never never made this bulletin public. -- -- 500 people out out of the thousands of drivers who had Carson faulty switches. Got the -- insert. And GM do it. Soon after this decision company officials quietly re -- the switch but they never change the part number. And astonishingly. This -- that this committee has slurred that when GM approved in this -- in 2006. They did it with still not still now waiting that the new switch didn't meet specifications. The company even put more -- at bats which is on the road from 2008. Until 2011. And we still don't know all the information about best -- -- -- 101003. And 2014. GM learned hundreds. Reports of ignition switch problems. Your customer complaints warranty claims lawsuits press coverage field reports and even more internal investigations. But time and time again GM did nothing. The company continued to sell cars knowing they were unsafe. I know we have a lot of family members here mister chairman. And I know and I want to express my deepest sympathies to them but I want to tell them something more. We're gonna get to the bottom of this we're gonna figure out what happened and we're gonna make sure it doesn't happen again. Chemists mr. chairman I wanna -- ms. buyer for coming she's brand new it the company. I believe she is committed to fixing this situation. We have a lot of questions asked today though. And I -- every member of this committee is concerned about this thank you very much into Italy's I'm expert now recognize -- from the full committee mr. Upton for five minutes. We'll take. Commission chairman. We know there with a two ton piece of high velocity. And machine -- there is in fact -- zero margin for air. Product safety is indeed a life or death issue but sadly vehicle safety has fallen short and it's not the first time. During the late summer 2000 in this very room -- -- the oversight hearings that examined the Ford Firestone recall but -- malfunction was causing violent crashes. And Americans did not feel safe behind the wheel. We gather testimony from the company -- agency officials reviewed thousands and thousands of pages of documents and we found that the system indeed had failed. Information about the defective tires have been shared with the companies and wouldn't it set. The parties failed to protect the public safety and over a hundred people died. After that investigation I introduced -- tread act to correct many of the problems that contributed to the Ford Firestone tragedy. That deal was meant to ensure that about safety it's reported. So that defects can be quickly identified and fixed and lives ultimately saved. The tread act is now been lost since November 2000. Yet here we are investigating another safety failure it's deja Vu all over again. One month ago GM issued a recall for an addition switched effect in six vehicles totaling one point six million cars. And last Friday the recalled another 900000 vehicles. GM acknowledges that a dozen people have died in automobile crashes -- show's associate -- of that defect. Two were teenagers. From my own community. Testifying today are GM's CEO -- of their and it's acting administrator David Friedman a first step in our quest to find out what went wrong. The committee's purpose is the same as it was in 2000. Making sure that drivers in families are protected in cars are safe. And -- repeat what I said at the first oversight hearing on Firestone tires in 2000. Today's hearing is very personal to me because I -- from Michigan. The auto state the auto capital of the world. That is no less true today Michigan is proud of its auto industry and while Michigan citizens build cars obviously we drive them to. Documents produced to the committee show that both -- and GM received complaints about and data about problems. With the ignition switches in airbags. These complaints go back at least a decade. It's -- engineers did crash investigations as early as old five -- twice examined whether complaints with their bags constituted a trend. GM submitted early warning reports -- its including data about crashes in the recalled cars. With all that information available. Why did it take so long to issue the recall. In this case just as it was with Ford Firestone. It was -- reports that brought the attention to the nation's attention. -- brought the problem to the nation's attention. This investigation of the recall is indeed bi partisan as it should be. We'll follow the facts wherever they lead us and we're gonna work until we have the answers and can assure the public that indeed -- -- safe. That looked like to note that the chairman of RC MT subcommittee mr. Terry will be joining us for questions this afternoon. With his subcommittee's record at motor vehicle safety issues he will be watching closely as this investigation unfolds. So that he can take our findings and determine whether in what changes may be needed to the laws designed to keep drivers safe on the road. After -- after all. Our -- on every issue follows the dingle model. -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- And where needed -- it would legislation. So that it won't happen again appeal to the vice chair of the committee ms. black. Thank you mr. chairman hand -- -- thank you very much for being. Here today -- we really -- this hearing to the American people to GM customers. And -- to the relatives of the twelve individuals that are lost their lives. And do it is important that we get to the bottom of this NBC bought the Ralston GM and it's a war -- this. Figure out who's at fault and we wanna -- -- -- quietly and in this -- that includes you. We're going to want to know what you're exposure was to this issue. And is to use took the Helm and GM as -- -- -- she you know in my district. We have the GM plant. The Saturn 99. It has been recalled. That was made at that plant near in Spring Hill said this is something that is important. To my constituents. Does -- that have worked with -- GM I thank you for being here and we look forward to the answers I yelled back. Thing -- -- back and now recognize McMahon of the full committee mr. Waxman for five minutes. Thank you very much mr. chairman I have sad sense of deja Vu as I sit here today. I was part of this committee when we held our Ford Firestone hearing in 2000. I led the committee's hearing on -- notice problems with unintended acceleration in 2010. Each time. We heard about how auto manufacturers. Knew about the -- Facts and about how federal safety officials at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Missed signals. That should have alerted them to defective cars on the road. And here we are today under similar circumstances. Over the last month the full dimensions of another auto safety disaster. Have unfolded. General Motors has recalled 2.5 million vehicles due to a defective ignition switch. And the company has acknowledged. That these cars have caused. Does is it crashes and thirteen fatalities. Mr. chairman I know the families of some of these victims are in the audience for today's hearing I want to acknowledge them thanked them for comment. We owe it to them to find out what happened. The facts that we already know are hard to believe. GM has known for years about the safety defects. And his failed to take appropriate action to fix the problem. The company installed an ignition switch you knew. Did not meet its own specifications. Numerous internal investigations. Resulted in nothing but day. Non public technical service bulletin that partially fix the problem for fewer than 500 drivers. A new analysis -- released this morning. Revealed that over the last decade. GM received over a 130. Warranty claims from drivers. And GM technicians. Who experienced and identified the defense. Drivers reported that their -- shut off after hitting bumps are potholes. Highway speeds when they did something as simple as brushing the ignition switch with their -- One GM technician even identify the exact part causing the problem. A spring. That -- would have -- -- As much as if you postage stamps a couple of dollars. Because GM didn't implement this simple fix what it learned about the problem. At least a dozen people have died in defective GM vehicles. What's more new information the committee received last week suggested GM still has failed to fully owned up. To potential problems. GM finally modified the ignition switch for later model cars. But Delphi the manufacture. Of the ignition switch. Told the committee. That the switches installed the model year 2008. To 2011. Vehicles that still did not meet GM's own specifications. GM finally announced a recall of these vehicles last Friday. But told the public. That it was because of bad parts. Installed during repairs. Not because of defective parts originally installed -- the vehicles. There are legitimate questions and -- we need to ask about weather and -- Did enough to identify and uncover this problem. In retrospective it's cool it's clear that the agency missed some red flags. Admits it was also laboring under handicapped. There appears to have been a lot of information. That GM knew -- they didn't share with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. We need to make sure that -- And the public. Have access to the same information. About safety as auto executives. That's why today I'm introducing the motor vehicle safety act of 24 team. This bills modeled on the legislation. That the committee passed and when he -- but was never enacted into law. It will make you more information on defects of -- to the public and it will increase. This is funding an increased civil penalties. For manufactures. When companies like GM failed to comply with the law. Mr. chairman we should learn as much as we can from this investigation. Then we should improve the law to make sure we're not here again. After another auto safety tragedy. In the near future. I when he yield back my time thank you chairman -- back. I know I can reduce the witness on the first panel for today's hearing. This mayor Barr is the Chief Executive Officer -- General Motors company. It has been in this role since January 15 2014. When she also became a member of its board of directors. She has held a number of positions in this company. From to -- -- eight to 2009 miss Barr served as vice president of global manufacturing engineering. And from 20052000. Nature with executive director. Of vehicle manufacturing engineering. -- also serve as a plant manager and director of competitive operations engineering as well as numerous other positions. And elsewhere in the witness. -- -- you are aware that the committee is holding an investigative hearing and -- doing so has the practice of taking testimony under oath. You have any objection to testifying under up. The chair -- advise you that under the rules of the house and the rules the committee you're entitled to be advised by counsel you desire to be advised by counsel during today's hearing. In that case if you -- please rise from his right -- elsewhere anyway. You swear that the testimony you're about to give -- the truth the whole truth and nothing but -- It. The -- you are now under oath and subject to the penalty set forth in title eighteen section 1001. Of the United States code. You -- now give a five minute summary of your written statement. Thank you mr. chairman and committee -- for -- Mike among close to amount make shirts on think it. Near me. Thank you mr. chairman in committee members. My name is Mary -- and -- the Chief Executive Officer of General Motors. I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. More than a decade ago team embarked on a small car program. Sitting here today I cannot tell you why it took so long for a safety -- to be announced for this program. But I can tell you we will find out. This is an extraordinary situation. It involves vehicles we no longer make. But he came to light on my watch so I'm responsible for resolving -- When we -- answers we will be fully transparent. With you with our regulators. And with our customers. While I cannot turn back the clock as soon as I learned about the problem we acted without hesitation. We tell the world we had a problem that needed to be fixed. We did so because whatever mistakes were made in the past we will not shirk from our responsibilities. Now are in the future. Today's GM will do the right thing. That begins with my sincere apologies. To everyone who has been affected by this -- Especially. The families and friends who lost their lives or were injured. I am deeply sorry. I've -- former US attorney -- -- the Lucas to conduct a thorough and unimpeded investigation of the actions of General Motors. I have received updates from him and he tells me he's well along with his work. He has free -- to go where the facts take him regardless of outcome. The facts will be the facts. Once they aryan -- leadership team and I will do what is needed to help usher this does not happen again. We will hold ourselves fully accountable. However I want to stress I'm not waiting for his results to make changes. I've named a new vice president of global vehicle safety a first for General Motors. Jeff lawyers top priority is to quickly identify and resolve any and all product safety issues. He is not taking and this task alone. I stand with him and my senior leadership teen stands with him as well. In we will welcome input from outside of GM from you. From -- sound from our customers. Our dealers and current and former employees. The latest round of recalls demonstrates just how serious we are about the way we want to do things at today's GM. We've identified these issues and we -- and forward and we're fixing them. I had asked thirteen to keep stressing this system at GM and work with one thing in mind. The customer and their safety -- the center of everything we do. Our customers who have been affected by this recall are getting our full and -- divided attention. We are talking directly through to them -- dedicated web site with constantly updated information and through social media platforms. We've trained in -- sign more people over a hundred to our customer call centers and wait times are down to seconds. And of course we're sending customers written information through the -- We've empowered -- dealers take extraordinary measures to treat each case specifically. If people do not want to drive a recalled vehicle before it is repaired dealers can provide them with -- loner or rental car free of charge. To date we prided provided nearly thirteen thousand loaner vehicles. -- -- -- -- looking for another car dealers are allowed to provide additional cash allowances for the purchase a police are new vehicle. Our supplier is manufacturing new replacement parts for the vehicles that are no longer in production. We have commissioned two lions and had asked for a third production line. And those parts will start being delivered to dealers next week. These measures are only the first in making things right and rebuilding trust with our customers. And as I've reminded our employees. Getting the cars repaired is only the first step. Giving customers the best support possible throughout this process is how we will be -- I would like this committee -- now that all of our GM employees and I are determined to set a new standard. I mean -- -- -- -- 18 GM up to and including our board of directors supports this. I'm a second generation G -- play. And I'm here as our CEO. But I'm also here representing the men and women who are part of today's GM. And are dedicated to putting the highest quality safest vehicles on the ground. I recently held a town hall meeting to formally introduce our new VP of safety. We met at our technical center in Michigan. This is one of the places where the men and women who engineer our vehicles work. They are the brains behind -- cars but they are also the heart of General Motors. It was a tough meeting. Like me they are disappointed at sat. I could see in their faces. I could hear it in their voices. They had many of the same questions that I suspect are on your mind. They want to make things better for our customers and in that process make GM batter. They particularly want to know what we planned to do for those who have suffered the most from this tragedy. That's why am pleased to announce that we have retained Kenneth Feinberg. As a consultant to help us evaluate the situation. And recommend the Basque passport. I am sure this committee knows mr. Feinberg is highly qualified. In his very experienced in handling matters such as -- having let the compensation efforts involved with 9/11. The BP oil spill and the Boston Marathon I mean. Mr. -- brings expert expertise and objectivity. To this effort. As I -- -- I consider this to be an extraordinary event and we are responding to it -- extraordinary way. As I see it GM has civil responsibilities. And legal responsibilities. We are thinking through exactly what those responsibilities are and how to balance them in an appropriate manner. Bringing -- mr. Feinberg is the first staff. I would now be happy to answer your questions thank you. Theme -- spirit are also wanted to now it's over the -- are here today another week. While wearing have sympathies all the committee here one Kelly and -- of Scranton Pennsylvania. -- of the one of those -- we offer something the famous but what we have all of you and our hearts. Ms. Berry art committee reviewed more than 200000. Pages of documents. What we found is that as soon as the cobalt hit the road in 2004. Drivers began to immediately complained to General Motors -- the car's ignition sits systems and work properly. He can complement to help Friday it is to drive a car that suddenly -- -- power steering power brakes. When the switch for the -- ball was being built back in 2002 GM knew this which did not meet its specifications for torque might correct. Yes. Jim engineers began to look at the problem and tried to figure out how to address Jim understood the torque in this which is measured below its own specifications is that right. Yes. It's a common practice for GM to accept -- part that does not meet Jim specifications. Now. But there's a difference between a -- meeting or not meeting specifications. And -- part being defective. So under what scenario is accepting parts that don't meet GM specs allowable example would that be when your purchase scene steal. You'll SATA specification for steel attend because of the different suppliers and availability of steel to make products. -- -- the performance. -- functionality the durability. You know the aspects of -- part or that an in this case steel. It is necessary to live up to what the performance and -- your ability to safety needs to be -- that putting a sample. When you would have a part or have materiel. It doesn't -- -- -- that was sent out but is acceptable from a safety from -- functionality perspective. Performances -- possess which acceptable. The -- I'm sorry this is to switch acceptable. -- -- -- at what time transparent. About the beginning and it seemed it didn't meet the -- for GM so is that what you would consider acceptable. As weak as we clearly known today it's. So in 2006 GM changes ignition switch and GM's -- supplier Delphi put in a new spring to increase the -- -- correct. And -- didn't -- the last part I'm sorry GM's which supplier Delphi put a new spring in to increase the torque is that correct and there was and you part thank. Now in that -- next two if you returned attempt to when he five. This is an email exchange between Delphi employees in 2005. Discussing the changes to the ignition switch the email notes that -- GM engineer is asking for information about the -- and switch -- as quote. Cobalt is blowing up in their face in regards to turn in a car off with the drivers -- quote. If this was such a big problem why didn't GM replace ignition switch -- the cars already on the road. The cars -- -- torque -- well below -- specifications and said it just a new cars why. And I what you just -- does not match under -- toll. That's the bottom of the page -- should be something there but just -- to what I've -- -- by apologize for that but there was a statement made the cobalt is blowing up their face. -- despite going bump with a driver's name. Clearly there were a lot of things that happened there's been a lot of statements made as it relates. That's why we've -- anti and the Lucas -- do a complete investigation of this process. We are standing over a decade -- that you don't know why they didn't just replace the switch -- -- -- cars as well some of course I do not know the yesterday at and that's why we're doing this investigation. Are given the number of complaints about -- turning off for driving so why wasn't this identified as a safety issue. Again I -- answer specific questions at that point in time that's why we're doing a falling complete investigation. And another one in the chronology GM submitted to nets that GM states that didn't make the connection between the ignition switch problems and the -- -- deployment comes too late to -- -- thirteen. So my question is when GM decided to switch the ignition -- 2006. To the company ever examined how a faulty ignition switch could affect other vehicle systems like the air bags. And that's part of the investigation. Today. Should we understand it should -- look at how it affects other vehicle systems. Yes. Let me ask another question and so when Jim -- you heard from my opening statement that the tooling cost and price pieces -- -- -- what does that mean. I find that statement to be very disturbing. As we do this investigation an understated in the context of the whole time line. If that was the reason decision was made that is unacceptable that is not the way we do business in today's GM. Well how does GM balance cost. And safety. We doubt today if there's a safety issue we take action. If we know there is I. He was their culture in GM at that time that they would have put cost over safety. And we're doing -- doing a complete investigation but I would say in general we moved from may cost culture after the bankruptcy to a customer culture. We've trained thousands of people I'm putting the Casper first we've actually gone with outside training. It's out part of our core values and it's one of the most. Important cultural changes were driving in General Motors today. I understand today we're asking about -- I'm out of time mr. get -- recognized for five minutes thank you very much mr. chairman. As far as GM -- about the defects in the ignition switches as far back as 2001. Thirteen years before the recall correct. The yes or no will work. The investigation -- -- that. You don't know when GM knew about think defects. I will -- to take a look at tab seven in your -- black ms. Barrera. This is a GM documents. And what this GM document talks about is this switch. It says -- down. Evaluation on the switch revealed two causes of failure low contact force and -- Do you recognize that document -- This is the first I've seen this document okay. Well so you don't know how long. GM knew about this and I am and that's why I'm doing okay -- and fact outside the manufacture of the ignition switch -- GM in 2000 intent. That the switch was supposed to be. Fifteen. Men and then -- specification but in fact these switches were beef between four intended net. B specification. Is correct that it was a speech when he plus or minus five. And these switches were between foreign tanker racked. Yes -- now will work we know that now and and Daewoo and GM was notified by Delphi of this can -- yes -- now. I'm not aware of being out I'll pay that can I and a correct I was I I need a yes or no -- have five minutes I'm sorry. So as far back as 200410. Years ago. GM conducted a problem resolution tracking -- -- -- after it learned of an incident where the key moved out of the run condition. And it 2005. Chevrolet call by -- is this -- -- Again here relating specific incidents that happen you don't know it's hot and our entire -- you don't know about that. Take a look at -- -- place. Yeah and by the way ma'am I'm getting this information from the chronology that GM provided to the next right and -- about let me ask you. -- -- As far back as 2004. GM conducted a problem resolution tracking system inquiry after it learned of an incident where -- key moved out of -- -- condition is that correct. Yes thank you. Now after that he RTS inquiry. Mining engineer advised against further action because there was quote no acceptable business case to provide a resolution. And the PA TP RTS was closed is that correct. If that is street it is a very disturbing. To act yet -- his -- the way we make decisions okay. Again in 2005. GM received more reports of engine stopping when -- keys were jerked out of the run condition. Further investigations were conducted an engineer's provide propose changes to decrease is that her racked. It's part of our investigation to get back complete timeline and throughout much of this I'm taking from the timeline GM has -- which was a summary okay. As so as a result of the investigation. And technical service bulletin was issued to dealers. That -- car owners complain they should be warned of this risk and advice to take. An essential items from the key chain but this recommendation was not -- to the public. No public statements were issued no -- -- is that correct. It's my understanding yes thank you. In 2006. GM can't contract it would Delphi to redesign the ignition switch to use a new did. Yes and for some reason now. The new switch was not given a part number and instead -- a number with the aboriginal defective switch is that correct yes. Now this new switch also did not meet GM's minimum -- specifications. Either. This one Delphi said was in the range of ten to fifteen. And it really should have been fifteen at a minimum is that correct. I had not seen a test results from you don't know that okay. Now despite these facts GM continued to manufactures cars with the same ignition switches for the model years 2008. To 2011. -- -- Iraq. Yes and between 2004. And 2014. No public notices were issued as a result of GM's knowledge of these facts. And no recalls were issued for the over 2.5 million vehicles manufactured. With these defective ignition switches is that correct yes and finally. Three recalls were made this year 2000 -- that -- 20142. In February and one just last Friday is that right. Related to -- -- -- now I have I have just a couple more questions. The first question I have. -- -- GM is intending to replace all the switches for those cars beginning on April 7 is that right we will begin shipping material are -- her now are you gonna put it completely redesigned switch or you can put both switches from 2006. And to those cars it's going to be a switch that meets. The basic going to be a New Britain newly redesigned switch or sickened -- be the old switch from 2006. It's the old design it meets the performance that's required to act -- I have -- -- mister chairman perhaps we can do another round. But an important part -- follow up of several members Spain be concerned but this to your saying that there's an ongoing investigation you cannot. Comet and Egypt are you getting updates on a regular basis that this is going on for mr. -- -- From anybody in the company regarding these proceedings are you getting updates -- yes -- thank you. No -- chairman of the full committee mr. -- for five minutes but. TM is a borrow for for being here this afternoon. I want to make sure that we asked similar questions of both you and of -- We want to learn about the documents that were submitted on a timely and appropriate basis said today it says and in fact. What did they do of that information. The documents it. That we've looked at those produced to show that GM received complaints about its cobalt and missions switches for about two years. That ultimately resulted in -- redesigned ignition switch in 2006. -- within GM would have known about those specific complaints. What was the process spectrum. I I was not a part of that organization -- time that's -- doing the investigation to understand. So you'd eat you -- you don't noted that the folks at it would have been reported to at this point there right -- -- the the people who would've been handling this issue at that point but you getting updates and what what's what's supposed to happen what looked looking back what should have happened when these reports came in. In general when you have an issue. A product issue a safety issue a field incident any type of issue that comes in. You have a team of engineers that I the most now sold at work and that if they see there is an issue they elevated to a cross functional team that looks at it. And then it goes to -- -- a group for decision. Now we know that the ignition switch was in fact redesign because it didn't meet -- -- that -- there is that right yes. Now. I would guess that engineering 101. Would normally required that when you assign a new part or replace a new part for a replace apart with a -- part. That that newly redesigned party in fact should have a different. The number -- is that right distract. So -- that didn't happen right did not act of Iraq. Who within GM made the decision. To move forward with that -- -- Without a new part number you know with that is again and the name of the individual -- -- -- to be able to find that out for well. And we'd give that name to -- community and provide. Who is it -- is it likely that that same person. Was the one that decided. Not to recall the detective version of what were -- that word where in the timeline is that I don't know if that is part of the investigation that we're doing. Do you know when it was. That it was discovered what year what you know Lou where the timeline that it was discovered that. Infected -- part number. Was not a signed. I became aware that asked after we get -- -- the timeline was put together so that was just in the last month or so as -- that's when I became aware. The win when did at GM realize that no new part number had been -- -- Again that's part of our investigation. I I'm I want to know that just as much -- you because that is an unacceptable practice is not the way we do business. So you've stated publicly that something went wrong with our process. How is the process supposed to work. How how is this how how are you -- -- the process to me to ensure that infected should work the way that. -- -- -- -- -- one of the things we're doing is the investigation by mr. Lucas I have some early findings for mr. Lucas. As we look across the company. It appears at this time there -- it was information in one part of the company and another part of the company didn't have access to that. Not at times they can share information despite -- course of process or they didn't recognize that the information would be valuable to another area of the company. We have fixed that we have announced a new position Jeff -- who is the vice president of global vehicle safety. All of this will -- -- to him he will have additional staff and we'll have the ability to cut across the organization. We'll also have the right functional leadership that understands what's going and the different areas so that's affixed with Marty made. -- and he's operating that -- today. Selling. GM received complaints about the ignition switches for a number of years it. Ended up resulting in the redesigned ignition switch in 06. When was it did did anyone linked up the ignition switch problems. To look at the air cobalt airbags at that point was -- about the same time was it later what's what's the timeline. That is something I very much want to understanding no but I again this is we are doing an investigation expands over a decade. And it's very important because designing -- -- is a very complex process that we get a detailed understanding. Of exactly what happened. Because that's the only way we can know that we can six processes and make sure never happens again. When was it did GM informed its. Did in fact it redesigned the rule would did in -- GM -- -- Nixon did the ignition switch had been redesigned. I don't know. You a year back. To me -- americanize the ranking member of the -- -- mr. Waxman for five minutes. Thank you mr. chairman. As far we've heard about -- in 2002. GM approve the use of faulty ignition switches in cobalt so islands and other cars. That's what caused many of the problems. That led to the recall of the cars from model years 20032007. So new ignition switches were designed and approved by General Motors. These -- switches that were used. We use in the model years 2008 to 2000 time at 2010. That also write to you. -- corrective but I'm saying. There's a couple statements made at the beginning that -- I don't know what true well and in 2002. GM approved the use of what turned out to be faulty ignition switches. In several of my heart in face -- out parts that -- -- 2003. Was the earliest model. Well it. -- the tests were done at 2002. But that build cars that we're 2003 to 2007. So we had to recall those cars. And then there was a new switch new ignition switch. Designed and approved by GM. And these new switches. Reviews of the model years 2008 to 2010. Cobalt to the violence that to ask -- now it that's okay. But it at a briefing last week Delphi. Told committee staff with these new switches. Also did not -- GM specifications. They told us the force required to turn -- switches. Was about two thirds of what GM said it should be. And documents -- provided to the committee also confirm. That topped GM officials were aware of the out of respect switches in 2008. And 2002 vehicles. In December 2013. So. There's a document. If you wanna look give up its -- 39. Page -- six of your binder. There is a December presentation. For GM's high level executive field action decision committee. And that meeting at that meeting they show that the performance measurement for almost half of the 2008. So you -- to 20082010. Model year vehicles ignition ignition switches were below the minimum GM required. -- specifications. My question to use are you concerned that many 2008. To 2000. Ten model year cars -- switches that do not -- the company specification. It's. As we assessed this situation my understanding that there was work going and to look at these switches again looking at. Just because a -- Arab apart any -- part doesn't meet specification does not necessarily mean it is a defective part. As an analysis was going on the same time we were doing -- look across. To make sure we can get all of the spare parts and only recognized that spare parts might be. -- have been sold through through. Third parties that have no -- keen to know which -- We made a decision -- your -- -- all of those vehicles were informed that a lot of these cars and those model years had. Switches that -- just as defective as the 2003 to 2007 cars. That those cars were recall but you didn't recall the model year 2008 to 2011 vehicles. Until a month later. On march when he 28 why -- the company delayed recalling these newer vehicle. -- company was looking my understanding is the company was assessing those those switches but again at the same time in parallel they were looking at the spare parts issue in his spare parts issue. Became very clear we needed to go and get all of those vehicles because we couldn't identify which vehicles may have had a spare part putting them. I mean argued then and recalled the entire population. But you recalled those vehicles do you recall them later but not when you knew there was a problem. Well your -- recall of these later vehicles did not mention the faulty switches there were originally installed -- the cars they've mentioned only. Quote faulty switches may have been used to repair the vehicles. Why did the company not announce its sub -- switches may have been installed of those vehicles in the first place. And there was an assessment going and to understand it specification -- performance -- adequate. Wasn't it misleading to say that that. That's that company didn't tell them -- parts which -- maybe it is stalled in the first place what a vial of the later. Model car with its original ignition switch. You recall applies -- I don't have to do anything about my car might still. Still have a sub -- switch. We are company conducted detailed analysis of these late model vehicles conservative they're safe and -- -- provide the committee with warranty reports and other information. So we can do our own analysis. And believe we're recalling all of those parts. All of those vehicles are being out -- -- being recalled well I'm at in -- say it in conclusion mr. chairman I'm concerned. I know you're you've taken this job -- an inauspicious time you're trying to clean up a mess of his left behind for you by your predecessors but. I have one last question how can GM assure its customers that -- switches. Be installed. Beginning April 7 we'll finally meet GM's requirements and can. We have down and we are working very closely with our supplier our executive director responsible for switches is personally looking at the performance. Of the new switches we will do 100% and divine test seem to make sure that the performance the safety the functionality of these switches. Our are safe. Thank you chemistry expert -- Spurrier -- -- some person just want to be clear. Did you review the documents. GM submitted to the committee. No I didn't -- there was over 200000. Pages -- but the doctor mr. Waxman's -- met to review -- I just. -- right here this I actually saw this for the first time with -- -- account. Thank you. Now recognize ms. -- for five minutes. Thank you mr. chairman. And miss -- and you've mentioned several times in your comments today -- GM. So my assumption is today you are going to run GM and indifferent manner giving -- -- been run in the past. And -- for you are are making get some changes. And -- just a little bit about. Timeline helping us to get our hands around this because where this is the first investigation we're going to do we're going to have others. And continue to look at this -- get answers and figure out. What has happened here between -- -- and it sat and also within what happened to eight GM. So. You mentioned in your testimony if this came to light on your watch. So I am assuming that there was no widespread knowledge in GM about this issue until you became CEO am -- correct on that. At the senior level of the company we learned of this after the recall decision was made and January 31. I was aware they're in late December -- ways analysis going man and a cobalt issue but I had no more information and that. But I can -- sure you as soon as we understood the senior leadership understood this issue and that a recall decision had been made we acted without hesitation. OK then how did you find out about it was it -- room. Someone bringing the issue to use to say ms. -- we have a real problem here Horry -- doing your due diligence did you find out about it. The committee that the leadership committee responsible for making recall decisions made its decision on January 31. They notified mark -- who immediately picked the phone and called me. OK and could you submit to us the members of that leadership committee that make those recommendations thank you and and net. Why should eat in your predecessors. Mr. -- your predecessor was he aware of this issue. Not to my knowledge he was not -- any of the members of the leadership committee also. -- were -- a part of his leadership committee. There are members of the city to today's -- that were also members of mr. actresses leadership team and to -- -- they -- matter where -- -- Do you think there was a cover -- That is the question I guess mr. bilirakis -- -- and anxiously awaiting the results from his his study and came. Do you think it had anything to do with the auto bailout. With and -- with auto bailout do you think it again I need to get the results of the study -- to make all determinations. And to going back to what mr. -- say you're going to be sharing that information with us we will annual India -- -- While sitting here. The engineers that were responsible. For BS have you brought -- into the process I know this is something that. The park was actually created by Delphi. Correct -- And that they have an engineering team that was working on that so they have a shared responsibility. And liability and this entire issue have you met with -- and with the engineering team that was responsible. For. Before this switch. I have not which met with the specific engineering team. That is -- taxable but I am. Speaking to leadership and those individuals are being in interviewed. As part of the investigation. -- affected by mr. bilirakis OK now going back. DG say if this was a defective part. When you. Talked about it earlier -- We have learned when we when we knew I -- to recall decision was made and we later went back and looked at the chronology. There's points that suggest and that's why we're doing the investigation. Okay are right now I think that you're going to hear from more than one of us -- -- not having a new card number assigned. And that. Making that decision was that strictly adelphi incision decision or. Did that come into the GM's supply chain for that decision to be made as to how that part number. -- -- -- -- general level General Motors is responsible for General Motors parts numbers okay but again that's part of the investigation understand how that happened. Does that seem inconceivable. To you yes it is inconceivable it is not our process and it is not acceptable. Can I I would think that it probably is is not have you asked Delphi. If you can have access to their documentation and their email chain dealing with this issue. I have not. And will again mr. the Lucas will go as the investigation takes him to get the information he's needs to make a complete. -- accurate accounting of what happened. -- my time has expired thank you mr. chairman and yelled back to square their application. Ms. I would but from we have asked for that email chain from Delphi -- -- -- get that they'll recognize. Turned -- the committee. Mr. -- -- five minutes. Sure I thank you for your courtesy. I begin by telling the families of those who were injured or killed by the defective General Motors vehicles. They have our ships we believe the events here are tragedy -- -- tragic indeed. And I enjoy -- -- of expressing my condolences to the families. Who were killed were injured in those questions. Now it is in cover -- congress federal regulatory powers and general borders. To determine how these -- could have happened. And to take reasonable steps to ensure the safety. Of American motorists are -- travelers are moving forward. Expressed expect that this investigation will be thorough. And I counsel all this recorders. To be unabashedly. Forthright. Now -- are I'd like to build -- -- chairman Murphy's line of question. All by questions will require yes ergo -- If you cannot answer some of my questions. I expected -- will submit responses. For the record all. Available relevant supporting materials. -- -- -- Is it corrected GM has -- called approximately 2.5. Million small cars. And it measures -- -- -- the G-8 nations -- yes yes -- ago. -- -- is it corrected GM recently expanded its recall. Of small cars because it was possible. The defective ignition switches. May have been his ball installed as replacement parts -- -- -- yes. -- -- is it correct that the ignition switch. In question was originally developed in the late 1990s. And approved by General Motors. In February of 2002. Yes -- yes. Ms. Barrett is -- corrected -- -- own design specifications. Or search ignition switch required twenty plush. Or Meyers five -- -- centimeters. Of -- To move the switch. From the accessory position to the -- position yes or -- yes. Of those for is it correct and General Motors approved production of search. Ignition switch despite test results. By Delphi. -- the production part approval process. Or PPA. Community. -- his description did not meet GM's -- requirement yes or -- it's clear to me. Now -- prayer isn't corrected general voters approved a redesign. Of the ignition switch. Used in the presently recalled vehicles. April 2 thousands. Yes. -- Brett is it corrected GM's -- require -- -- the redesign is we're tremendous same as for the original edition where this. It is not clear to me and that's -- where focus the investigation and that area specifically. Whether that information becomes available would you should the yes. Rosenberg pure -- Did the redesigned editions storage. Me GM DISH Network requirements the -- or ago. -- -- What your knowledge did the redesigned ignition -- be GM's -- requiring gesture -- It's part of our investigation. -- Israel would you please submit for the record an explanation. Of the factors. That GM takes into consideration. -- program apart for production. Are there -- circumstances. Word you have mayor -- -- For production. Was searched -- do not make search desires specifications years ago yes. If so. Could you please. Submit materials for the record explaining why and why that might occur. Yes. There's very appreciate relates. To -- GM under leadership. Is -- -- -- called the vehicles. And insurers doctors say if you drive. By which. And the reasons. Decisions were made. DB upped the 2014. Her call you may have so far so. -- -- continue to do so. Thank you for -- -- -- chairman thank proven. I feel back. Chairman yields back now recognized the -- Chairman emeritus of the majority mr. Barton of Texas for five minutes thank you mr. chairman request my questions -- -- just a general observation. This is probably. The last major investigation. This subcommittee and full committee is going to conduct. Where we have the services of mr. dingle and mr. Waxman. We've had a history on this committee in this sub committee. Going back at least forty to fifty years that when we have major issues we try to approach them. On behalf of the American people in a nonpartisan. Very. Open wide and it certainly appears they were gonna continue that tradition today so. I hope that we can show the best to the American people. That the congress said its best gets the facts presents the facts and does so in a way that. In the future we protected the public health and safety for the American people. Now with that caveat I do have a few questions. A number of congressman so far have made the point that these ignition switches. It didn't appear to meet specifications. And I and my assumption is it that you've agreed that they did not meet specifications is that correct. We've learned that as we get 3COM. Ma'am common industrial engineer I used to be registered professional engineer and are currently registered but I have been in the -- -- Why in the world would a company. With a stellar reputation General Motors. Purchase. -- part that did not meet its own specifications. I want to know that as much as you do. It is not the way we do business today it's not the way we -- designing engineer vehicles for our customers. Mean -- just -- understand that I'm I'm. I'm never. Worked in an auto assembly environment I've worked in -- defense. Plan. An aircraft plant I was plant manager of a printing plant. I've done limited. -- very limited consulting in the oil and gas industry. But I've never been a part of an organization is said we set suspects. When -- apart. Or doesn't meet the specs we go ahead and buy it anyway. It's and -- just. You know you're currently that this CEO. But at one time I think to. Before you became CEO you were the class president. For global product development purchasing and supply action me. -- -- Is it. Your position now that General Motors. Will not except parts that don't meet specifications. We've -- have parts that don't meet our performance safety functionality -- -- requirements as I mentioned before in the steel example. There will be times where there will be -- a material or apart. That doesn't meet these exact specification. Friday after analysis and looking at the performance the safety the durability the reliability. The functionality. It will be okay that happens very often as we buy steel. To make the bodies of the vehicles. Within then you don't -- -- and with -- respect yet but what I just answered is probably use. But it's your own specifications. That your company specification if apart doesn't make the specification. Won the world which you not. Refuse it and -- and only except the part that meets this specification. There needs to be well documented process if you except depart that doesn't meet the original -- on a number of with the tournament Neil. Briefly -- do you have that information. And steel. Now on starters. And I'm the ignition switch -- if it doesn't doesn't didn't meet specifications you have information on the starters that it met -- other criteria. So at that is part of the investigation but clearly by the fact that we made a recall it did -- did not meet the perform. -- we have the advantage. As a sub committee that we know now. What happened in the past we know now that there is a real problem we know now that. -- -- a number of young people have lost their lives and apparently because of this this. Defects that we have the advantage of hindsight and I signed. I understand that but is ms. -- just says in in the number of others. There's no reason have specifications if you don't. Enforce them. This next question is not a trick question but it's an important question. Right now -- many parts. Are being used in General Motors product that don't meet your own country specifications. I don't have that exact number but I can tell you the parts that we're using today. Meet the performance can be reliability the safety. -- they need to if we find we have a part that is defective that doesn't meet the requirements. We then do a recall. Again with spat with -- -- -- that's not an acceptable answer I think to the American people. We're not telling you specifications. To -- now there are some safety specifications. That. By law and and it's about regulation sets. But there shouldn't be -- -- used in any GM product are for that matter any there. Automobile product that so the United States that doesn't that doesn't meet the specifications. My last quite well. At what level was a decision made up. Override. And the use this -- even though it didn't meet specification was that made at the manufacturing level. At the executive level or even at some sub component purchasing. Level do you know that -- part of our investigation to find it question answered that question thank you thank you mr. chairman. Thank you know are don't science part now recognize mr. -- for five minutes. Ms. borrow we've had different perspectives during this hearing -- -- appropriately focusing your attention on the members of this committee in answering our questions. I've been staring at these photographs on the back wall. And I see young women the same age as my daughter. I see young men the same age as my two sons. My son Paul -- one of your -- vaults. I see a young marine in his dress blues and I'm reminded of the photograph I have in my office upstairs. -- my father. At the age of eighteen in his dress blues Camp Pendleton. And the focus of this hearing so far has been on GM's commitment to safety which I think we all agree on is an important topic for this hearing. You testified in your opening man I'm think I'm quoting. Our customers and their safety are at the center of everything we do. And he responded to a question from ms. Blackburn. And to hold us that you were going to run GM differently. Than it's been run and in the past. And I have a copy of GM's march 18 press release. Announcing Jeff Boyer -- your new vice president of global vehicle safety and in this press release he is quoted as saying. Nothing is more important than the safety of our customers and the vehicles they drive. Two days G out. Is committed to this and I'm ready to take on this assignment. Twenty years ago -- Before this hearing. An Iowa -- -- harm by another defective GM vehicle gave me. This promotional screwdriver set that they got from their local GM dealer. And if you look at it on the outside it has a slogan. Safety comes first at GM. So my question for you and I think the question that these families back here want to know is what's changed -- -- Isn't it true that threw out its corporate history. GM has represented to the driving public that safety has always been their number one -- I can't speak to -- statements that were made in the past I can tell you is that we were working now. The training -- we've done we've changed our core values the decision making were leading for leading by example. Were. You know one of the process changes that we've also made. Is in addition to -- the technical community makes their decision about a safety recall or recall. We are going to be reviewing it I'm Mark Grace the head of global product development and myself to see if there's more that we want to do. We -- the core values. Of General Motors always span that safety comes first. I've never seen that part before isn't it true that throughout the history of the company it's made representations. Like this to the driving public. As a way of inducing them to buy your vehicles. Sit at today's General Motors -- I can I can tell you -- today's General Motors we are focused and safety we have over eighteen vehicles that have a five star crash rating our entire. -- -- meets that requirement we take a -- we're talking about these vehicles. And what's changed. He had a chance to read this article in the Saturday New York Times full of Florida engineers -- -- moment with a deadly GM flaw. I believe -- -- a portion of that article okay this is an article by a writer named bill loss sick. Any road in here about an engineer -- -- mark could. Who is at a loss to explain why the engine and -- mountains cobalt had suddenly shut off causing her fatal accident in 2010. And Georgia. Then he bought a replacement for thirty dollars from a local GM dealership in the mystery quickly unraveled. For the first time someone outside GM even by the company's own account. Had figured out a problem that it had known about for a decade and is now linked to twelve deaths. Even though the -- which had the same identification number. Mr. -- found big differences. And then the article continues so began the discovery that would set in motion GM's worldwide recall of two point six million cobalt and other cars. And one of the grave his safety crises in the company's history. Do you agree with the author that this is a grave safety crisis in the history of General Motors. And sad that this incident took way too long it is not acceptable and that's -- were making radical changes to the entire process adding more resources. -- a vice president of global vehicle safety who is tremendously experienced and end of the highest integrity. And we will continue to make processes and process changes -- people changes. As we get the results of the mr. -- Lucas investigation. And we will take all of those. Recommendations and we will make changes. Before I yield back mr. chairman I would like to ask unanimous consent to have this article added to the record for the hearing if it's not -- part of the record. We have two objection so. If the Tillman would -- his remaining seconds. Miss Harris said -- changed their core values. I think it would be great if she could submit to us what -- new core values for GM are so we would have those for the record. -- have for the record. And I would also like to have any prior statement of core values from general motor over the last twenty years -- that we can see what has changed mr. term will be asking them members were several questions to submit. GM the record americanized. Vice chair the sub to me doctor -- for five minutes. -- the chairman I think the witness for spending so much time with us this afternoon. You. Mentioned ms. -- in the start of your written testimony that over a decade ago General Motors embarked upon a small car program. Do you recall why that was. And -- why did GM embark upon a small car program ten years ago over a decade ago. To have complete portfolio I believe. The but the -- the mission or live is this type of -- manufactured by GM previously had not. Had not fit that model so this was an entirely new business line. That GM was undertaking. That's called -- and their several front speakers to seek speaking specifically about the coal vault. It was filed a -- a previous small car but it was an all new program architecture -- -- around. Was in part of this done. Then. Because of the cafe standards that -- changing the vicinity of this done because of congressional action -- -- occurred previously. I can answer that question wasn't in a decision making at that point. Let me ask you this. When mr. Waxman was giving his opening statement he said it was a shame that national highway traffic. Safety administration did not have access to the same information. The General Motors had do you think that was a fair statement for him to have made. It's as part of the investigation we're doing I'm looking at what information was provided in -- And that's you know becomes and the troubling part of all of this I think -- to get ahead. Had you look at tab -- to -- in the information binder. And this was. Talking about the ignition key cylinder assembly. -- the date of the PDF that I have is January 1 of 2005. He can you find that under tab bait but later on in the same document. If says we are closing this was no action. The main reasons are all possible solutions were percent to -- The lead time for solutions is too long to -- and costs because tooling costs and price. Peace price are too high. And none of the solution seems to fully. Countermeasure the possibility TV -- so. That was all in January. 2005. A man. You know as part of our document. The valuation for getting ready for this hearing there were several accident reports that were supplied to us. And one of those occurred not too far -- in Maryland. In the middle of the summer of 2005. And in that accident sequence -- cobalt. Hit a series of trees at the end of a -- sacked. This -- the driver. Fatally injured during that she wasn't wearing a seat belt wasn't terribly large individual she -- about a hundred pounds. Because the airbag did not -- though -- -- -- -- that would be -- Why -- have to wonder had the airbag deployed what her small frame. Have been protected -- -- broke the rim off the steering wheel because of the impact of the collision her body with the steering wheel steering column. Of course is steering being -- being somewhat in Denton toward the driver of the lower part of the driver's body. Give her under the rib cage apparently resulting in a liver laceration. Which resulted in the sanguine nation in the time sequence to get her out of the crash in debtor to the hospital. You can't help but wonder because they're the other injuries that were reported with that -- are really fairly. Fairly mild. He's got to believe the -- -- would have made a difference there I just can't help but think that. The people evaluating this must've asked themselves why. Why -- -- went off with this type of crash she was going seventy miles an hour and get an oak tree. Wouldn't that be a logical place for an air -- to deploy. Percent it's a very tragic situation some of the fatalities in these vehicles -- again we -- -- strategy and we tests as a strategy and we have apologized. As I read the document that you asked me. I find that unacceptable. That any engineer would stop at that point. If there was an issue that they felt was -- safety defects and that's why we're doing the investigation. Can't put a complete timeline together and I commit -- -- we will take action and we will we've made process changes. We will. -- the process our goal is to have a world class safety process. And -- I respect you for for being here and answering that way. One of the other accidents it's recorded an. Where and -- the cobalt was not at fault another car went over -- at the center line. And there was a hand on impact again the cobalt airbags did not deploy. The driver of the other vehicles the airbags did -- mean it seems to me that should be a red flag to the people who investigate. Air -- non deployments as an occurrence or as as an issue. In fairness let me just state that all of the front seat occupants of both vehicles. Word we're deceased as a result of that accidents over the deployment of the air bag in that situation. Did not protect preserve the life of the driver. But still you'd have to answer -- you gotta cobalt and Hyundai. Meeting head on why did cobalt air bags not -- it was exact same force for both vehicles and and there was no intercede and jarring of the vehicle they didn't run off the curb they didn't run over another tree first -- the airbag did not deploy it. And why would that have been the case and that particular accident. And it's -- it's a trench six situation any time there's a loss of life in a traffic situation. -- I this is not a report are an investigation that was done by GM. I age I -- -- your questions because it's usually very complexes they look at that site I I can I can't count on and this particular study. If that is part of your internally -- I don't know -- -- likely to make that information available to the committee staff into the committee. We can we will make whatever information we haven't bailed them thank you and thanks for being here -- -- times expert knows recognize mr. -- five minutes. Thank you Mr. Mister chairman. Mr. -- talked about the pictures in the back and I think that what must make it mark it even more painful is that these deaths -- needless. So I want to ask you about something a little bit more than an apology. One of the many questions raised about GM is how -- to -- Is how they were you will handle accidents that happened prior to their company's bankruptcy. GM filed for bankruptcy in June 2009 emerging as new -- about six weeks later so that means. That new GM the company as it exists today. I've been told may not be liable for accidents that occurred but prior to July 2009. Is that your understanding -- -- We at General Motors want to do the right thing for our customers and that's why we feel this is an extraordinary situation as I've said. It took too long to get to -- answers in the understandings. About this part. That's why we've hired mr. Feinberg. We feel mr. Feinberg has had extensive experience -- he will bring his experience and objectivity to. -- what are the appropriate next steps because we do understand that we have Citic responsibilities as well as legal responsibilities. Are you saying that. -- hiring of mr. Feinberg. Indicates that GM will. Arm. Give some. Some kind of settlement with those individuals whose staff and the families who looks loved ones lost their lives. We are -- -- just began to work with mr. Feinberg affect her first meeting will be on Friday. -- it will take probably thirty to sixty days to evaluate the situation so I have we have not made any decisions we have just started. This process with mr. frank. And that might include people have been injured as well. And I we have not made any decisions let me ask you this. During GM's restructuring. Did the company disclose what it knew about this ignition switch -- fact. By 2009. There is no doubt that officials and GM were aware of this problem. I was not aware of this issue I can't speak to what was disclosed that -- so again our investigation will. Cover if there -- any information but to my knowledge there was it was not known at the senior leadership of the company. So does GM accepts responsibility for the accidents caused by the company's defective vehicles. We fight for survive again want to reiterate we think the situation is tragic. And we apologize for what has happened and we are doing a full investigation to understand talking about responsibility. And -- liability. And responsibility and I'm -- I don't understand -- liability. Do you take responsibility. As the company responsible. The we didn't -- GM as a responsible. The we will make the best decisions for our customers recognizing that we have legal obligations and responsibilities as well as moral applications. We are committed to our customers and we are going to work very hard to do the right thing for customers. I hope that you do do the right. -- let me ask you about some of the people who. Potential -- can do about its -- So you've reported a new for the first time made a president of global vehicle safety I have to tell you I'm underwhelmed by that. Thinking that it such an obvious thing to have someone high up. That would in fact be able to connect the department so everybody knew I guess it's a good thing however that it's finally I thought I finally done. So we know. That -- did you or G DiGiorgio. Was the GM engineer who approved the ignition switch -- -- in 2006. Is he still an employee of your company nightly news. Do you know who signed off on the initial faulty ignition switch to that did not -- your specifications. I down but that's what I will learn with the investigation. And after we have a complete investigation from a very complex process. We will take action little change process and we will deal with any people issues. I think we demonstrated in the issues we learned. In India with a -- -- -- about a year ago we will take it take serious steps and hold people accountable. So. No one right now has lost there job as a result. This knowledge about this defective part. We -- just a few weeks into the investigation by mr. the look as we -- made process changes and as I returned to the office after this we will begin to look at the implications. Now that we have for data coming from the investigation. And take the appropriate steps thank you -- -- that. -- -- -- Americanism from George Doctor King -- for five minutes. Mr. chairman thank you very much -- saw hearing is much appreciated pretty -- -- -- since Brooke Brooke Melton. Lived in my congressional district of the time and had it not been for an outstanding. Plaintiffs' attorney in in the -- judicial district. Of Georgia and bring in this case I'm sure it was against the local dealership. Results settlement but it brought to light what's going on now and and the purpose and hopefully off. Some good can come from this hearing and I want to thank chairman Murphy for holding it and in investigating the root causes the General Motors recall. Of over two point six million vehicles linked to it that these ignition the defects unfortunately ms. -- are heard -- -- today. That that recall now includes six point three million vehicles. And I do want to speak a little about this young lady named -- -- a nurse in Spalding county Georgia. We're to the time was in the district I represent and she was as you know tragically killed march at -- -- twenty -- On her 29. Birthday. In -- horrific side impact. Accident how how -- 92 and the ignition switch in the accessory position. Just a day before -- just the day before her death she took her 2005. Chevy cobalt into the dealership for surface. And the service report stated. Cost of most states engine shop all while driving please check in the quote. Despite the fact that -- service bulletin was issued. From General Motors for faulty ignition switches back in 2005. Foot -- make and that model. The on site mechanics clean the fuel -- Clean the fuel injection told to come pick up -- car which she did. Brooke melted it's tragic death is not acknowledge. As part of this recall because that involved. A side impact instead of a front impact. Mrs. Malcolm's parents -- and -- That hot here today I don't think but they deserve answers ms. Barrett is Brooke Melton. Included in General Motors dipped down Yeltsin. Tonight -- Know it was a side impact from the writer. -- -- why did General Motors not include the -- on deployment of air bags from side impact accidents. Resulting in loss of life or injury in this recall. -- issue look at a frontal collision and the -- the air Vegas to operate. I believe the assessment that was the assessment was made that would potentially be related to this switch. You have a miss Vera if you connect the dots I mean -- the ignition. Gets knocked over to the accessory position. There was a problem -- use and faulty. Even by your own standards equipment. And and so maybe what happened was that all of sudden the car stalled. She's driving perfectly. Trying to control what daddy palace tearing without any power brakes. May very well have I don't know the details that accident. But may very well -- run through a fool why are red lie and was slammed the two from the side. Whether it was a head on collision our side collision it was for -- for the same reason and she is did. And that was almost four years ago. I don't understand why why General Motors does not include -- on deployment of air bags from side impact accidents. Resulted in loss of life for injury in this recall can you explain that to -- But first evolved all of the accidents and fatalities are very tragic and -- as you've indicated and were deeply sorry for -- -- -- been very clear of the number that we put forward there's been a lot of analysis that's gone on to look at potential incidents. And. Well the world -- General Motors investigate -- do you plan to investigate. Well that this condition relates to an on deployment air bags -- and you know side impact corrections. We have -- individuals that are looking at. The available information from an accident you're told us about your your recent -- and I hope there will latch wouldn't ms. -- to to what extent -- genome. -- -- -- -- -- Like the dealership obviously in Cobb -- All of its 2005. Technical service Bolton. On faulty ignition switches so that these service technicians these young guys you know -- work in their six months to a year. That they could properly addressed a cost of a complaint like Brooke had the day before her death. And cherish your question had a -- communicate service bulletins -- -- -- -- Had you make sure that these dealerships all across the country in their service departments. -- or or making sure that their technicians. Are getting and receive in the instruction. We can provide ID 2000 exactly how we communicate service bulletins and how that's rolled out to each of our dealerships across the country. I hope you will thank you thank you ms. -- and mr. chairman by your back ms. spirited and related to his questions with all these cars and recall and waiting for parts what are driver supposed to do in the -- time. When -- Carson in the driveway. -- we have out. Indicated it would done extensive testing that if you take the if you just the missing keys with the rain for just ignition -- that vehicle is safe to drive. If people are not comfortable with that we are making loners are rentals available they can go to -- dealer. -- we have over thirteen thousand. Customers that have these vehicles and rentals are loners right now. And in your assuring people that it is safe to drive if they just take -- Other things -- execution and extensive testing done by the engineering team and with just the key -- -- -- the key. -- we believe it is safe based on our testing. -- -- -- misuse or mister chairman is that true of the of that earlier -- mentions -- as well as the 2006. -- all of them. All these -- that's true and is aren't yet thinking. Mr. -- -- were classified minutes thank you mister chair. -- -- thank you four appearing before the committee and I have to believe for the team members. Family members and friends of the victims of this tragic outcome. Let's be very painful process to sit here -- and listen to the exchange. Just to comment at first. We're hearing a lot about information that will come -- the investigation -- the review. However I hold in my hands February report. And a march report and it's. On behalf of GM. Under your watch. -- that provides detailed time lines. With the hope that have now -- exchange. And I'm confused somewhat. About that fair amount of now -- that has been formally exchanged and that's. NASA and -- At the same time we're hearing well we don't know. Until the investigation is complete so. There's a conflict that I think is is brought to bear here. In terms of in exchange that has been detailed in the last few weeks. Under the watch of the the new General Motors today's GM. And at the same time when I was listening to. Corrupt senator from Illinois ask about. The corporate chart and the changes. No changes have been made. We're waiting. For that pending the investigation but at the same time we've characterized to -- the labeled. It as today's General Motors. So while we're all products at the environment that produces us. That cultural impact of GM. Seems to still be in play. With a number of people who have perhaps shifted positions. But all part of that organization so. Comfort me by telling me that. There's a new thinking there's a new culture that is beset GM while all the players are. There in the corporate chart. Coming how the company has restructured and reorganize so as to -- bring comfort. Two the consumer. First term many new people in the company as well as people who have experience across the company. There is it. A new structure for instance in global product development we've streamlined eliminate for accuracy we check out an entire -- layer of management. And the product development. We've completely redone the quality process is over the last and it started in the two when he eleven 2012 timeframe. We changed her test procedure we've added additional validation so there's -- complete remake of the way we drive quality. We test a failure instead of testing to aid to -- -- a standard. That's just one example. And we've looked across the entire organization we've rebuilt our supply Safire quality organization. Heading over over a hundred -- is just in this country alone. So there's systematically gone across the company and were making changes. Even in that car analogies which I think -- held up. Those are the most. With the information we have now but that we are conducting an investigation with mr. bilirakis which also rolled out -- values with. Customers are compass relationships matter -- individual excellence we've trained thousands of people. And but most importantly its leadership at the top. It's the leadership of how we behave how we demonstrate -- we make decisions and that we make decisions that focus on the customer focus on safety focus on quality. And I can tell you and from my leadership team in the next -- we continue -- that every day we recognize culture change doesn't happen in a year or two. But we are well on that journey and we will are dedicated to it and we very clearly want to have the safest vehicles on the road. And will you make that a list public from the idea from the report that here anticipating. Concern when you make the list that will be coming forth. Public -- you -- the list and -- The full report coming from mr. Phillips. Mr. Lucas will give us find jeans and we will make the appropriate findings available to this body to our customers into our employees the appropriate findings what about the full report. I'm that count I don't know if he'll give a report earth we'll share -- if he does we share the full report little -- the appropriate information not the full report. Again I don't know if there be a full report that we will share if there will be a full report will you share I commit that we will be very transparent and we will share what's appropriate. So in other words there's no commitment to share the full report. And she scene and we'll share what is appropriate. I hear -- answer. -- -- -- In Germany respect recognized -- of Louisiana mrs. -- for five minutes. Thank you mr. chairman appreciate your time this hearing. Department for. Being here and let me first -- my prayers -- with all the families. Of those who lost their -- -- others who've been impacted by this I want to thank you all from Ian. Here in this room as well obviously the questions we have -- or even more pertinent. To the families that are here and that's what's important that we asked questions that get answers and if we're gonna work to make sure that. We can prevent something like this from happening again we've got to get into. The real details of what. What went on during those period of years unfortunately years where it seemed somewhere inside of General Motors there was -- -- that this was a problem. Before -- level recall and want -- first. Taking this -- to. The tab you've got their number 38. Tab 38. He has the to sign off this is it's called a General Motors commodity validation sign off this is the actual. -- that the engineer. Signed off on. That. Approved the design change in the faulty ignition switch -- have you seen that. Document before. This is the first I've seen this document that's labeled. Now what we're talking about -- and how how long have you been aware of of the problem with these faulty ignition switches. I was aware that there was a faulty ignition switch on January papers. Of this year -- OK so as your. As you're going through I'm sure some of the questions you have been there are asking may -- some -- ones we're having. First question you would want to ask is -- -- we know I don't when did we know did we know. Well in advance and in why didn't we prevent it from happening. The first thing we all are talking about -- -- was this. Found out within GM to the point where they actually made a change to meet you all made a design change the letter of -- here this this form. Is dated April 25 2006. So 2006. Is when -- engineers and there's -- -- one -- there's an actual engineer who you just said. Under oath earlier is still employed with GM there's an engineer at. Actually sign this document. Requesting. Not request approving a change in this ignition switch in fact with a partner for the part numbers on here. Has anyone in your knowledge is it -- -- GM taken us this pretty important years you -- just pulled aside right now and asked him. When you signed off on this in 2006. Number one why didn't you change the part number. And number two -- Why did you approve a change in the ignition switch and not bring it to the level recall in 2006. Clearly people lost their lives after. After the school signed off point so they do you know right now and you you're you're under a do you know -- anyone. That has asked the person at science that signed off on this have -- -- -- asked him those -- questions. I know this is part of -- the Lucas investigation and I wanna know the answers to questions you're asking what do you know do you know. Of anyone that's asked him that question he's an employee your right now you might get you pulled aside week break when you leave here today an -- questions. But I think it's very important as we do an independent investigation. That -- let mr. Lucas go. Do a thorough investigation. Talk to people that there's not a lot of site investigations going and he is the one -- standard that we're gonna use in this investigation clearly -- the objectivity to it. Clearly you know their -- you talk about a new culture. Has anyone been held accountable. As of now for what's happened. Again we are just -- this we learned of this and -- January. 31 -- again you have got -- you have a design change in 2000 and sex related to what we're talking about this is not a 12014 initiative to recall was issued. And 24 -- but but the product that that the product the faulty ignition switch were talking about. Was -- at 2006 -- one a year engineers who still unemployed General Motors. If you can't get that information in if you do find that information out by the way would you get that to. The committee it will be part of the investigation and -- and -- other question when ask you because later on we're gonna have. The acting administrator of the national highway traffic. Safety administration. Some of the things he says in his testimony before you leave I'd like to get. At least some responses he says number one we're pursuing an investigation whether GM met its timeliness responsibilities. To report. And addressed this defects under federal law are you where. Of whether or not GM has met its obligations. Of timeliness that'll that'll be part of the investigation that we're doing to you're not aware at this time though I mean if you're aware of something that that be a violation of federal law you're aware -- that. All ready. Can you share that -- us. I am aware -- the findings at a party shared for mr. bilirakis and how can another question he asked in the brief time I have left he says GM hat. Critical information that would have helped identify. This defense that's the gentleman that's testifying right after you. You don't. Have the opportunity to come behind him. And in response he's going to be saying the -- brightness in his testimony. What would you say in response to his statement that GM had critical information that would have helped identify the -- As -- party said we have already learned through mr. -- investigation that there were points in time where one party organization had information. That wasn't shared across to the other side of the organization of you can call -- a silo. At some point they can understand. That the information would be valuable to another party. So -- -- shared that we have found that to be true we party made changes to the structure and to the responsibilities of people so that won't happen again. We appreciate. Getting the full range of answers to all these questions and what that -- back amounts Tom thank you strip -- now recognize mr. green for five minutes of Texas thank thank you mr. chairman and ms. Barr first of all congratulations. On. Being the CEO of General Motors. Like a lot of my constituents I've been a customer GM. It back deck here listed number vehicles I think I've owned a them alive -- to Tahoe at least Malibu I have a blazer and in you know so -- we -- for a long time. And -- job appreciate GM product and you heard the question in today from. It seemed like on about parts -- bases -- we're trying to find out what's happening. Although -- chairman -- -- you heard it. I was surprised his doctor gave grief to good friend a man -- a physician and to say he thanked the plaintiff's lawyer percent and you least gotten Republicans and Democrats on the -- something. So Phil's not here now but. But there is series -- have a civil bar. You've gone down the litany with the other questions. The problems that were happening. In C and 2002. The switch was was our knowledge of his blows back to 2005 the dealers were notified of a problem. But it was. Because of Havier hearings and I thought about my wife's hearing that she uses it it's like has everything in the world -- hearing -- I couldn't imagine that would be an issue but. But I guess getting down to that the concern I have in the 2007. -- modified the -- ignition its future models. But it though this week's edition still -- well below the initial -- -- by GM. Maybe deviate example of what this is cost. -- -- a constituent throughout talked to yesterday for a -- Houston in whose mother bushel to 2003. Regal. Which is ten years old. In it she's old GM products like I guess I have for many years. But the regal -- stalling in turning off in February 13 -- even a car adolescent 50000 miles. -- -- Errors that she's on the cards don't -- -- GM dealers six times the batteries been replaced and each time the dealer did not fix the problem. She ended up finding out quote this -- to -- told to -- that she found they found a trade. -- A shade tree mechanic who actually fixed it. And I guess what bothers me if you go back to the dealer this many times and -- hold the dealers. You know repair shops to -- -- higher level since it because they know the product. What is happened can -- confidently say that these stalling issues are limited only to the cobalt the HHR the Pontiac G five. Solstice and Saturn ION in the -- models of the -- vehicles -- in other words like the regal. Or maybe ought to Malibu -- Again I I'm not aware of any other styling issues if we have an issue we put it into our -- our our recall process and make decisions so there's a well we'll get to that information from what they had. I have couple minutes left it. -- -- -- are very industrial area we have refineries and chemical plants what we do is inherently dangerous. And so you have to take extra concerned about it. In it looks like in the last ten years GM has not somewhere along that line and the culture of the company. It's not there to deal with that. And as the new CEO our hope you would make sure it happens and I said this many times an elaborate chemical plant refinery there's an accident. In somebody dies. In we've been able to pinpoint sometimes -- civil -- percent time through chemical safety board. On what the decision was made if they didn't do that calls people to back. That's what happened here. In General Motors is much greater content company than to do that -- our hope the culture of your corporation. Would be better soared to continue to earn -- respect -- Vote this lady in and I have. In -- that's your job now as CEO but you need to fix it. In fiction as quick -- -- -- and because it's gonna cost problems obviously. I agree with you it is completely my responsibility and I will work day and night we party made. Tremendous change at General Motors will continue to do that and I recognize it's my responsibility. The last thing about thirty seconds is sure that can my constituent. -- she ever bothered Phoenix take that regal back and have it checked by didn't dealer now. See what happens and I wish -- it -- send a note to me and I -- I'll get to that information yet. Thank you -- chairman. He americanized mr. Griffin. For five minutes. -- chairman. This very you have indicated that the not having a new part number when the -- was changed in 2006. Is not acceptable. Is that correct yes -- And pat I guess it's hard to figure that somebody would have just done that by accident and that there had to be -- reason. Because that was a breach of protocol wasn't it I don't think there's an acceptable reason to do okay. And while there may not be an acceptable reason it you would have to acknowledge that a reason in somebody's mind while not acceptable. Might be that it's actually harder to track the problem. With the old part when you have an improved new part that's put in its place isn't that correct yes or -- Yes yes. And while you have indicated that she did not know that the individual name of the person who made that decision do you know whose job title it was or in whose chain of command it was. To make the decision not to. Creating new part number for that part. I I -- -- be in within the engineering organization but I will learn that from the investigation and we will take appropriate action. And -- that engineering. Department have been under your chain of command at some point in your tenure with GM. Since 20. It's February at when he eleven. But it never got to use an American brought this to your attention -- now. Appreciate that I do have this question I think that the answer probably is is that your investigation will reveal this. But it is somewhat. Concerning that. While the trial lawyer that uncovered this may be very savvy and his expert might be pretty sharp. You all have short people working at GM as well do -- not. I believe we -- and we need it's it's one of those questions that I'm sure your investigation -- government why not. Why didn't your team of engineers. Connect the dots and figure out that women winning ignition slips into that auxiliary position their bags won't. Function properly. Congressman doesn't -- questions I want to answer and as I've said it's taken to wait too long and we will learn from this and we will make changes and we will hold people accountable. And not only holding people accountable you raster earlier and I know -- -- a tough spot on that as to what kind of liability. GM will end up accepting because there's legal liability and moral liability and you've you've said that. One of the questions that I would have would have been a whole lot easier just to look actually listed this these liabilities in the bankruptcy wouldn't wouldn't it would it would it. Not. Who'd been easier to do it in the bankruptcy instead and the command now with. The best thing in the world would be as soon as we find an -- problem we fix it. And it doesn't exist in the marketplace and doesn't affect our customers and doesn't -- tragedies. And and here's. Here's one of the things that concerns me have you been have you been given any estimates -- by mr. Feinberg or others. As to what a best case worst case scenario is on your civil liabilities. We had just down. -- -- initial conversations with Arafat with mr. Feinberg I believe we will work through him to evaluate the situation over the next thirty to sixty days. Has anybody else -- your best case -- worst case scenario reliability issues related to this problem. There's been an. A lot of of estimates stand in the public but none given specifically to me. Of it. Would those. Liability issues. Have negatively impacted. The prospects of either a bail out by the federal government or prior to the bail out. The people who were lending you money -- keep GM afloat with its heavy liabilities already existing. Would not be additional liabilities. That would have come forward. By this problem. Have had the potential to dissuade. Private investors or the federal government from. Giving cash to -- As I look at it -- as soon as we identifying issuing six it. And there are our liabilities -- -- liabilities are contained. And that's what we as we look at problems as we go forward we want to -- and missing -- we can if there's a safety issue. We're going to make the change and make the right investment in except that. But in -- in the real world of business. If there's a new set of liabilities. That come on to the page they weren't there before it's harder to get money from both public and private sources. Isn't that true. I think it depends it depends on the situation such a general question and and I don't. Feel for brick how many. After -- that. -- let me ask this last question when this issue was first men's issue first came up recourse funding problem resolution tracking system report. Document that identified the issue severity three what does that mean. And Terry and -- severity three. Reference in backs on the documents -- dividend and -- that your folks have given us and -- the -- initial assessment in 20042000. When your problem resolution tracking system report came out it and it related this problem is being severity three what does that mean. I don't have a specific definition that I you give -- enforce can't appreciate that and I yield back. That's clarifying question for for would -- for saying to. DGM. Purposely. Willfully negotiate. During the bankruptcy. That -- pet issues. Or in the process of obtaining the loans to they purposely withhold any information. That they may have known about pending lawsuits -- things it would be emerging in the future about the -- Walter of the cars. I am not aware I personally did that withhold any information I am not aware but I I. Can't speak to every single person -- thank you. Mr. -- recommends a five minutes thank you I have to congratulate General Motors for doing the impossible. You've got Republicans and Democrats working together. And I think I thank god my colleagues for their focus on this hearing. A couple of things. How many cars have been recalled. And sent -- state. -- related to the ignition switch right over two point at nine. This. Ignition switch issue was first. -- come to it came to light in 2006. Is that correct. -- Education will know when it came to light came to light to me -- January 31 when he fourteen but that I -- that's totally irrelevant. To the people who lost their lives. Hi Anderson -- that current. CEO but that's not relevant to the question I just fast -- are anti US when I became aware of -- you know GM. Again that's what will learn in our investigation. Will you change the switch. After 2006 she began in 2007 change in the switch right. Yet there were changes made so would it be a logical inference that somebody thought there was a reason to change the switch that had been in use in 2006. To 2007. As we do and our internal investigation I have to get those answers but -- can. Would that -- starting point somebody for some reason. Decided to change the very critical part in the car between 20062007. Correct correct. So let me ask you this if you had recalled cars and acted on this aggressively. In 2006. When you are making the decision to he had to change this with you GM not you it's -- -- and change the switch how many cars would you have had to recall that you acted in 2007. When you made the decision. To change this switch. I can get you the exact number but it would have been significantly -- I don't I don't give me an estimate. To you talk to your background -- if you want I would -- again I won't confirm -- cancer but I would assume it is some -- around more one point two million. Just from 2000. So you to cut it down at least in half -- -- -- because again we're starting with vehicles that Saturn -- was in production in 03 let me just get. A business type question here. What do you estimate would have been the cost to GM of this recall had they done it 2007. When we looked at the population promote 31007. Actually if I look at all of the because I had this it would have been higher and apparently there was one point eight. And it would've probably. The estimate costs for those two pieces is something less than a hundred million. -- and would you estimate will be the cost of the recall now that is being done eight years later. Well there's and there's a larger population we can provide the information I and I want an estimate it. Well -- I want people to be able here this means that there were the decision delayed. Is money in lives at risk so I'm trying to get an opinion from you. And it's ballpark so it can be adjusted. As to what the cost would have been had you act in eight years ago -- is acting now. You GM. While if we -- back at that point -- -- had a had a smaller population as we talked about it I know that that's obvious and and -- asking about the -- don't understand your question. And you know what -- fire on the board of directors. And I had an obligation. To shareholders. And I had a company that could -- eight years ago to deal with the problem. But by not acting. Let debt problem. Increase in magnitude. Do more damage to shareholders. Do more damage to the bottom line. Do enormous damage to the reputation of this company. And cause but we don't -- how much harm to citizens. I wanted to answer the question. I agreed it would give it would've been out substantially less at that time frame had we -- it then what it will be now. GM was involved in litigation concerning allegations that this which was defective and cost problems correct. -- -- And GM settled some of these litigation matters correct correct after very aggressive defense. Those settlements for secret. -- -- confidential. Both parties. By both parties I'm you know -- have been in court by both parties usually means by the request to the party that's paying the damages. I wasn't involved in the settlement island Ellis capital commitments by both -- it's not but you're you are the company right now. -- let me ask this question do you believe that when a company. That has been sued. About a matter involving products safety. Where a person has been seriously injured or has died. That the company that settles as a matter of policy should be entitled to keep it secret. What that settlement was about. I am Matt. I think that there are issues associated with that that every settlement is is unique and it's a decision that -- agreed to by both parties. And -- right at -- at -- -- let me ask another question one is unique if a company. GM or any other company. Settles litigation. And -- -- substantial amount of money. Pertaining to an allegation about serious bodily injury or death. -- that company be permitted to keep secret. -- settlement. From the governmental agency whose responsibility. Is to protect the public safety. That is information required on Friday government agencies and we would provide aid if the two parties involved in the settlement -- to it. That's -- agreement so if you don't have to do it you won't do it. Hey if both parties -- want that. I'm making the assumption that both parties agreed to -- which is what I've been told him I yield back. Thinking in terms times expert now recognizes -- for Missouri. Five minutes and you've been watching in the married Barack testimony as well the upcoming testimony from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration chief David Friedman -- still. Has yet to talk a strained right here on abcnews.com. Rebecca Jarvis we'll have a complete report on world news with Diane Sawyer. -- can keep up with the story also in real time by downloading the ABC news happens starring in this story for exclusive updates on the ago. For now I'm Michelle president New York with this ABC news digital special report.

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