What's Ahead for Israel

July 26, 2006 — -- Israel's two-front war with the forces of Islamist extremism is taking place against a Middle East and international backdrop that is near-revolutionary. The region is split along radical-moderate and Shiite-Sunni lines.

Iran, exploiting American mistakes, has spearheded a Shiite revival. Iran and Syria together are leading the radical camp. The traditional Sunni Arab powers, Egypt and particularly Saudi Arabia, are encouraging Israel to proceed and cut Hezbollah down to size, thereby delivering a setback to Iran and Syria; Egypt is again trying to mediate a cease-fire and prisoner release agreement with Hamas in Gaza, on conditions advantageous to Israel.

The international community, led by the United States, is delaying intervention in the hope that Israel's strategy in Lebanon will pay off, despite the massive destruction of infrastructure and humanitarian suffering in that country. (Not surprisingly, both Iran and Saudi Arabia are poised to pay for Lebanon's recovery.) When the war ends, a non-United Nations international force of some sort is almost certain to replace the Israeli Defense Forces in southern Lebanon.

After nearly two weeks of war in Lebanon, and even longer on the Gaza front, we can begin to identify those broad areas where Israel should and should not develop new strategies.

Beginning with what not to do: Israel cannot and should not try to impose a "new order" on Lebanon or, for that matter, on the region. Israel's contribution is to strike a first, serious blow at the forces of radical Islam surrounding it on two fronts. But any Israeli attempt to lead in a regional political sense will be counterproductive. The less said by Israel about changing the region, the better.

On the other hand, the current conflagration does provide a unique opportunity for Israel to quietly draw closer to the moderate Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, on key strategic issues. It is no coincidence that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert wants Arab states to participate in a multinational force in Lebanon. In this regard, it is now imperative that Israel and the moderate Sunni states also quietly confront the United States with the consequences of its precipitous democratic reform policies in the region: the enfranchisement of radical Islamists, mainly Shiite, and the strengthening of Iran. Israel is currently paying the price for this mistake (though it contributed with mistakes of its own as well); it's hoped that it is undoing some of the damage.

But Washington, too, has to be brought into a more active role in this regard.