Carrot vs. Stick: Curbing Iran's Nuclear Ambitions

Feb. 23, 2006 — -- The ideal solution to Iran's nuclear crisis is for both sides to "take a deep breath" and for the United Nations, United States and Europe to attempt to persuade Iran, through a series of carrots and an assurance of fuel from other suppliers, to give up permanently its uranium enrichment program.

This is the conclusion of a report issued today by the International Crisis Group, a nongovernmental organization dedicated to crisis prevention.

"Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse?" acknowledges both the difficulty of persuading Iran to give up this key part of its nuclear program and the absence of other viable options. U.N. Security Council sanctions will be difficult to agree upon and enforce; military options are unattractive against a country where the nuclear program is a point of national pride; and the facilities are dispersed and well-reinforced against attack.

As a fallback, Crisis Group, which is based in Brussels, Belgium, proposes what it terms "Delayed Limited Enrichment," under which Iran would first agree to delay for several years any uranium enrichment, to be followed by a period of "confidence building" with only laboratory-scale enrichment and intensive monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Robert Malley, Crisis Group's Middle East program director, believes this is a practical way forward that takes into account all sides' most pressing concerns.

"Iran is lawfully entitled to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]. The U.S. and Europeans are legitimately concerned about the potential for nuclear weapons work. What we propose is a way to reconcile these competing needs, which up to now have been irreconcilable."

For its part, Iran has given no indication of willingness to stand down activity at Natanz, home to a pilot-scale facility housing 164 centrifuges, a few of which have recently started to receive uranium fuel.

Mark Fitzpatrick, senior fellow for nonproliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said the United States was reluctant to accept any kind of enrichment activity in Iran "because once Iran develops this capability, they could easily replicate it to make nuclear weapons secretly, which even the most intensive IAEA monitoring could not detect."