Analysis: Iran's Nuclear Leap Forward

April 11, 2006 -- -- Anthony Cordesman is ABC News' military analyst and the Arleigh A. Burke chair in strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

He offered the following remarks about the developments in Iran.

• The IAEA found Iran had probably carried out test enrichments of uranium with its centrifuges long before this.

• A claim of 3.5% enrichment is not much of an achievement if true.

• There is no clear evidence that Iran has brought the limited 164 centrifuge chain at Natanz on-line in any kind of sustained operation. A one shot, limited output test has little meaning.

• These are old P-1 centrifuges. It takes thousands operating continuously for a year to have major output and 10,000s to get seriously into the weapons grade production.

Cordesman's detailed analysis of Iranian nuclear facilities follows.

There is a long chain of indicators that Iran is proliferating. Iran's missile development problems only make sense if they are equipped with CBRN warheads. There have been numerous confirmed disclosures of suspect Iranian activity. Iranian nuclear program has been under intense scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in recent years, and the IAEA reports disclose a pattern of activity that makes little sense unless it is tied to a nuclear weapons program.

Yet, the data on Iranian nuclear weapons efforts remain uncertain. The summary reporting by the IAEA has not stated that there is decisive evidence that Iran is seeking such weapons, although the detailed disclosures made in IAEA reporting since 2002, do strongly indicate that it is likely that Iran is continuing to covertly seek nuclear technology. Neither the U.S. nor its European allies have as yet released detailed white papers on their intelligence analysis of Iranian efforts, and there have been several press reports that U.S. intelligence feels that its knowledge of the Iranian nuclear program is less than adequate to make the case for where, when, and how the Iranians will acquire a nuclear weapon.[i]

Iran does have the right to acquire a full nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes under the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty (NPT), and the Iranian government has been able to find ways to justify all of its activities to date as research, related to nuclear power, minor mistakes, or the result of importing contaminated equipment. It has claimed that its concealed and secret efforts are the result of its fears that the U.S. or Israel might attack what it claims are legitimate activities.

In fact, Iran may have advanced to the point where it can covertly develop nuclear weapons even if it agrees to the terms proposed by the EU3 and Russia, and appears to comply with IAEA inspection. As the U.N.'s experience in Iraq has shown all too clearly, there are severe limits to even the most advanced inspection regime. Iran might well be able to carry out a covert research and development effort, make major advances in weapons development, and improve its ability to produce fissile material. Iran might well acquire a "break out" capability to suddenly make weapons or be able to produce small numbers of weapons without detection.

At the same time, it is hard to discuss the case against Iran without raising questions about the mistakes the U.S. and the U.K. made in characterizing Iraq's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. in particular, has problems in convincing the international community that Iran is a grave threat to global security. Credibility is a precious commodity, and one that can sometimes be worth more than gold.

The problems in addressing Iran's capabilities go beyond the ability to determine the facts. Since 2002, the Bush Administration and EU3 have consistently argued that the Iranian efforts to acquire nuclear weapons are real and that they must be stopped. The ability of the US, the IAEA, and the EU3 to halt the Iranian nuclear program is complicated, however, by the mistakes that the U.S. and Britain made in dealing with Iraq

It is also impossible to deny the fact that Iran is being judged by a different standard because its regime is associated with terrorism, efforts to export its Shi'ite revolution, and reckless political rhetoric. There is nothing wrong with a "dual standard." Nations that present exceptional risks require exceptional treatment. The fact remains, however, that Iran was under missile and chemical attack from Iraq, and seems to have revived its nuclear programs at a time that Iraq was already involved in a major effort to acquire biological and nuclear weapons. Iran has major neighbors -- India, Israel, and Pakistan -- that have already proliferated. It must deal with the presence of two outside nuclear powers: Russia near its northern border and the U.S. in the Gulf.

The situation is further confused by the fact there is an increasingly thin line between the technology needed to create a comprehensive nuclear fuel cycle for nuclear power generation and dual use technology that can be used to covertly develop nuclear weapons. A nation can be both excused and accused for the same actions. This can make it almost as difficult, if not impossible, to conclusively prove Iran's guilt as its innocence, particularly if its programs consist of a large number of small, dispersed efforts, and larger "dual-use" facilities.

Some efforts at proliferation have been called a "bomb in the basement" -- programs to create a convincing picture that a nation has a weapon without any open testing or formal declaration. Iran seems to be trying to develop a "bomb in a fog;" to keep its efforts both covert and confusing enough so that there will be no conclusive evidence that will catalyze the U.N. into cohesive and meaningful action or justify a U.S. response. Such a strategy must be made more overt in the long--run if it is to make Iran a credible nuclear power, but the long-run can easily stretch out for years; Iran can break up its efforts into smaller, research oriented programs or pause them; focus on dual-use nuclear efforts with a plausible rational; permit even intrusive inspection; and still move forward.

There is more information available on Iran's nuclear programs than on its chemical and biological programs, but this scarcely eliminates major areas of uncertainty. Estimating Iranian nuclear capabilities is complicated by three key factors: