Tony Blair Interview: Complete Transcript

Dec. 10, 2006 — -- QUESTION: Mr. Prime Minister, thank you very much for doing this.

Both you and President Bush embraced this Iraq study group report today, but isn't it a repudiation of the course that you and the president have followed?

BLAIR: I don't think it's a repudiation of the basic mission, which is to try and make sure that the Iraqi people's will is done and that they're able to have a proper functioning government and democracy.

But what it does call for, rightly, which is what, in an event, we're working on, is to make sure that we have all of our strategies and situations changed, because what you've now got is a different type of conflict there, basically a sectarian conflict between Shia and Sunni and it's being provoked by terrorism and sectarianism.

QUESTION: Isn't that a sign that the Iraqi people may not want...

BLAIR: This is one thing that's really interesting, actually. No, I don't think it is. But the purpose of the terrorism and the destruction and the chaos is to force them into that position.

But when the Iraqis came and voted, 70 percent of them, which, after all, is a higher turnout than either in the U.S. or the U.K.

QUESTION: Much higher.

BLAIR: And they voted explicitly for a nonsectarian government. The government was formed on that basis. You had Sunni, Shia, Kurds in there.

Now, because of what has happened over the past year, and this is what terrorism does -- the purpose of terrorism is not the act that kills the people simply. It is to produce a chain of consequences and hatred and division from that, but then seeps the will of people to come together and makes them divide.

QUESTION: And the report says that there are Shia and Kurdish leaders who are not committed to national reconciliation. There are large parts of the army, large parts of the police forces who are more loyal to their ethnic or religious group than the nation.

BLAIR: But this is why, when I was talking about the evolution of our strategy, this is what we've got to address, because my view is that the majority of those people, they don't want to be in that position.

But if they can't see the government in Iraq gripping the situation and moving it forward, then they default to sectarian positions.

So what we've got to do, and I think the report very helpfully sets this out, whether it's on reconciliation or security or force capability, both army and police, or on the governance and the basic capability on the economy and other areas like that, there needs to be a coherent plan that the government signs up, that we support, and that then takes…

QUESTION: And it lays out a very ambitious plan for the Iraqi government, but, also, says that if the Iraqi government doesn't meet it, the United States and, by implication, the United Kingdom should withdraw its support.

BLAIR: It's important that we make it clear to the Iraqi government we support a nonsectarian future for Iraq. We're not supporting a future for Iraq that is about either breaking it up or having a situation in which sectarian factions fight each other.

And I think what is interesting about the report is it sets out in a lot of detail, as you say, exactly what is necessary to produce that greater capability, and that's what we've got to work on.

QUESTION: And if they don't meet it, you'd be willing to leave.

BLAIR: Well, I think to be absolutely blunt about this, we have to make sure this works and I don't think, at the moment, this is a kind of hypothesizing if it doesn't work. It's got to be made to work, because the consequence, as they said, is strategic failure.

QUESTION: How much time do we have?

BLAIR: We are in a situation where we need to act urgently, in my view. Now, let's be clear, we are doing things. For example, down in the south of the country, we have gone through Basra now, half of Basra, with the Iraqi forces, putting the Iraqi forces in charge, bringing in reconstruction and development. It's working pretty well.

If it continues to work well, we will be able to allow the Iraqi forces to take over the security control in Basra.

Already, in two out of the four provinces in the south of Iraq, they are in control.

The real problem, frankly, is in and around the Baghdad area. That's the really critical issue. And then we've got to make sure that we put together, as I say, that capability, particularly in the Iraqi armed forces, that allows Prime Minister Maliki to assert his control over the capitol city.