I mean, that is -- you -- they are not. This is -- this is what the regime used to -- sold to the -- to the West and to the U.S. "It's either us, repression, or -- or -- or Al Qaida-type Islamists." That is -- that's not -- this is not Egypt.
AMANPOUR: Are the Islamists behind this uprising?
ELBARADEI: Not at all. I mean, what -- what you saw is the young people. I mean, it's all 30 and below. It is organized plan, implemented by people who are 30 and below who are -- absolutely have no ideology other than they want to see future hope, a respect for their dignity, and -- and basic needs.
AMANPOUR: How do you think this is going to end?
ELBARADEI: Well, I think -- I think everybody should understand, you know, that it will not end until Mubarak leaves today, until we agree with the army on a national unity government, until the army got hold of the street. If we do these three steps, you know, and ensure in the process the basic needs of the people, then we get a smooth transition, an Egypt that is democratic, that is moderate.
You know, it does not mean that Egypt will be hostile to the U.S. This is -- again, we traditionally in Egypt, in the Arab world, have always been friends with the U.S., friends with Europe, and I -- I have no doubt that that will continue, but under the basis of a stability and not pseudo-stability, where -- where you are oppressing people in -- in the country.
AMANPOUR: Mr. ElBaradei, thank you for joining us.
ELBARADEI: Thank you very much, Christiane, for having me.
AMANPOUR: And to delve deeper into this very issue, we're joined now by a man who has helped navigate U.S. foreign policy, way back during the Iranian revolution. He is Zbigniew Brzezinski, who used to be President Carter's national security adviser, joins us now. Thank you for being with us. I want to start by asking you, does Mubarak have to go? Or, as the administration seems to hope, he can implement enough reforms to get through this moment? Is that realistic?
BRZEZINSKI: I don't think that's realistic. What could be realistic is that Mubarak himself becomes convinced, with outside advice, that it is in his interest, as well as in Egypt's interests, that he goes and that he sets in motion a process which facilitates that.
I think the alternatives otherwise are much tougher. Either the army cracks down and the populace increasingly turns to fundamentalism, radicalism in reaction to the crackdown, or the regime perpetuates itself and an explosion comes later and even more violently.
AMANPOUR: Well, let me ask you then, because clearly the administration is grappling with a decades-long problem, how to have democracy in this part of the world without fundamentalism filling the vacuum. Do you think that is still -- particularly as you watch what happened in Tunisia, secular, young -- here in Egypt, it's mostly secular. We don't see the Islamic forces right now. Do you think that is still a fear?
BRZEZINSKI: Well, it still is a fear, but there are some examples which are warning to us, and there are some examples which are a possible source of encouragement. The warning is, of course, what happened in Iran, the takeover by theological fundamentalist regime hostile to the outside world, and particularly to us.