Book: W.H. Knew Iraq Had No WMDs

Tenet says he has not read the book but complains that Suskind did not attempt to interview him for the book. "Mr. Suskind never contacted me on anything regarding this book. I suppose he had a story that fell into the category of: "too good to check."

Suskind's book outlines months of alleged secret discussions with Habbush, beginning in Jordan in January 2003 with Michael Shipster, the head of Iraqi operations for the British intelligence service, MI6. In that meeting, Suskind reports that Habbush told Shipster that Iraq had no stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and no active programs to build them.

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Habbush told Shipster that Saddam Hussein was more concerned with threats from regional enemies like Iran than a US invasion, according to Nigel Inkster, a former senior British intelligence official quoted in the book.

Suskind writes that senior US officials were briefed on the discussions with Habbush, all the way up to President Bush, Vice President Cheney, CIA Director Tenet, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and the head of the British intelligence agency MI6 Sir Richard Dearlove.

"The reaction inside the White House was one of surprise, then skepticism, from the president on down. After being told that Habbush had said there were no WMD, Bush was frustrated. 'Why don't they ask him to give us something we can use to help make our case?' he told an aide," Suskind writes.

After Shipster had met several times with Habbush, British intelligence prepared a final report for their American counterparts, which Tenet then used to brief President Bush and then-National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, according to the book.

"The report stated that according to Habbush, Saddam had ended his nuclear program in 1991, the same year he destroyed his chemical weapons stockpile. Iraq had no intention, Habbush said, of restarting either program," Suskind writes. "The White House then buried the Habbush report. They instructed the British that they were no longer interested in keeping the channel open."

A former CIA official, Rob Richer, who headed the CIA's Near East division, tells Suskind in the book that the White House simply ignored Habbush's information and later told British intelligence that they no longer wanted Habbush as an informant.