How Much Progress Have Iraqi Forces Made?

— -- Iraqi forces are making major progress, progress that should provide a new degree of legitimacy and popularity to the Iraqi government and allow the coalition to reduce its forces. There are, however, still many problems, particularly in the security forces in the Ministry of the Interior and in the police forces.

Political success and military success are interdependent. The new Iraqi forces can succeed only if the Iraqi political process succeeds. Political success requires security. If the emerging government does not include a large number of Sunnis, and undercuts popular and political support for the insurgency, the efforts to develop Iraqi forces may be in vain. An Iraqi government that is Shiite and Kurdish dominated and uses its forces against Sunnis and not simply the insurgents, is a recipe for civil war.

The attached analysis explores these issues and the details of Iraqi force development in depth. It provides numerous tables and graphs that may be used for future reference. Its key conclusions may be summarized as follows:

Progress in Iraqi Force Development

In spite of the problems facing Iraqi forces, they have made major progress. Changes in the U.S.-led coalition advisory effort have led to steadily higher selection and training standards and better equipment and facilities. Embedding U.S. training teams in each new Iraqi unit, and pairing them with U.S. combat units until they could operate on their own, has made a major qualitative difference in the field. More and more Iraqi units have come on line.

The end result is that the coalition now sees three pillars for the successful development of Iraqi security forces. The first is proper training and equipping of the security forces. The second is the assignment of transition teams, and third is the partnership with coalition forces. The corresponding development of fully effective Ministries of Defense and Interior may well be becoming a fourth.

As of late January 2006, Iraqi forces had already totaled some 227,300 personnel. These included 106,900 in the armed forces under the Ministry of Defense: 105,600 army, some 500 air force and some 800 navy. They included 120,400 in the police and security forces under the Ministry of Interior: 82,400 police and highway patrol, and 38,000 other Ministry of Interior forces.

A total of some 130 army and special police battalions, with some 500-800 men each, were fighting in the insurgency. This was seven more battalions than in late October. The army alone had built up to 102 battalions, approaching a current goal of 110 combat battalions.

By early December, a total of 50 battalions were at Level 1-3 readiness and active in dealing with the insurgency. In March 2005, there were only three battalions manning their own areas, all in Baghdad; 24 battalions were in charge of their own battle space in October and 33 in late December. In January 2006, the U.S. Army transferred an area of operation to an entire Iraqi army division for the first time in Qadissiya and Wassit Provinces, an active combat area south of Baghdad. In early February of this year, 40 of the army's 102 battalions had taken over security in the areas where they operated, and in contested areas, such as parts of Fallujah, Ramadi and Samarra.

This progress occurred despite the fact that the Sunni Arab insurgents focused their attacks on fellow Iraqis and hit hard at every element of Iraqi forces. The insurgents also struck at virtually every other element of Iraqi society and attacked Shiite Arab and Kurdish political leaders, religious figures and journalists, other members of the Iraqi elite, and ordinary citizens -- often in the form of suicide bombings that created mass casualties. The most extreme Sunni Islamists clearly had the goal of paralyzing the Iraqi political process, and such extremist groups attacked Shiites and Kurds in a way that seemed designed to provoke a major civil conflict.

Such progress, however, is not yet sufficient to guarantee either any meaningful force of Iraqi victory, or the ability of the United States to make major troop withdrawals and still claim success. The following remaining problems in shaping effective Iraqi forces must still be addressed:

Ensuring that they will act as national forces and not Shiite and Kurdish forces,

Giving Iraqi combat battalions better balance and support.

Giving the security and police forces the same level of training and advisory support as the regular Iraqi forces.

Matching force development with political development and inclusiveness

Supporting Iraqi forces with effective governance by civil authorities.

Regular Iraqi military forces still lack balance. They are still lightly equipped, and an initial emphasis on putting as many combat units into the field as possible means they lack adequate headquarters, support and logistical units. As a result, major further improvements are still needed in the regular forces that would take well into 2007 and require sustained U.S. advisory efforts, aid and military support, both as operators and as trainers/advisers for at least several years after 2007.

As for the political dimension, most top Iraqi officials, and senior Iraqi Arab Shiite and Kurdish political leaders, continue to stress the importance of developing Iraqi forces that maintain a rule of law, and respect for human rights in spite of the insurgent attacks. They emphasize the need to fight corruption and change the culture of Iraq's military and police forces to stress professionalism and promotion by merit.

Nevertheless, the Ministry of the Interior failed to act effectively to implement such goals and allowed some elements of its special security units to act as a virtual extension of Shiite efforts to attack the Sunnis. While he has since taken some corrective steps, major new efforts have had to be undertaken to reform the forces of the Ministry of the Interior and both the special security services and police. Such efforts are only beginning to have an impact, although the Ministry of Interior has fired the commanders responsible for the worst abuses.

More broadly, the police still cannot act as an effective force in many areas of the country, and have many elements that lacked both competence and loyalty to the central government. These problems were compounded in Sunni areas by the difficulty of finding forces loyal to the national government. They were compounded in Shiite areas by loyalty to Shiite religious parties and intimidation by -- or partnership with -- Shiite militias. Many of the police were also local and lacked the training and discipline of the police units trained and equipped by the coalition and central government.

Both Iraqi forces and civil government are still far too slow to occupy the areas where the insurgents were defeated by the military and security forces. This lack of governance and the ability to establish security without military forces has remained a major problem in many parts of the country and made it difficult to exploit Iraqi and coalition military victories in areas favorable to the Sunni insurgents.

The Course of the Insurgency

The war in Iraq also remains all too real. MNF-I intelligence estimates that the number of insurgent attacks on coalition forces, Iraqi forces and Iraqi civilians, and acts of sabotage, rose by 29 percent in 2005. The total rose from 26,496 in 2004 to 34,131 in 2005. These attacks have had a relatively consistent average success rate of 24 percent for attacks that cause damage or casualties.

At the same time, there has been a shift to attacks on Iraqis rather than coalition troops. A total of 673 US troops were killed in 2005, versus 714 in 2004, and the number of wounded dropped from 7,990 to 5,639, a drop of 29 percent. U.S. forces saw fewer casualties largely because more Iraqi forces were in the field and there were no major urban battles like the battle of Fallujah, and also because the insurgents shifted to Iraqi targets that were more vulnerable and had far more political impact at a point where it became clear that the United States and its coalition partners wanted to withdraw many of their forces.

These trends scarcely mean the insurgency is winning. It is not able to increase its success rate, establish sanctuaries, win larger-scale military clashes or dominate the field. It is mainly active in only four of Iraq's 18 governorates. (Some 59 percent of all U.S. military deaths have occurred in only two governorates: Al Anbar and Baghdad.) Much of its activity consists of bombings of soft civilian targets designed largely to provoke a more intense civil war or halt the development of an effective Iraqi government, rather than progress toward control at even the local level. So far, the insurgency has done little to show it can successfully attack combat-ready Iraqi units, as distinguished from attack vulnerable casernes, recruiting areas, trainees or other relatively easy targets.

At the same time, the insurgents are learning and adapting through experience. They have shown the ability to increase the number of attacks over time, and they have hit successfully at many important political and economic targets. Provoking civil war and undermining the Iraqi political process may not bring the insurgents victory, but it can deny it to the Iraqi government and the U.S., and the Sunni insurgents continue to strike successfully at politically, religiously and ethnically important Shiite and Kurdish targets with suicide and other large bombings.

The insurgents continue to carry out a large number of successful killings, assassinations, kidnappings, extortions and expulsions. These include an increase in the number of successful attacks on Iraqi officials, Iraqi forces and their families, and well over 2,700 Iraqi officials and Iraqi forces were killed in 2005. The Department of Defense estimated that 2,603 members of the Iraqi forces had been killed in action by October 2005, far more than the 1,506 members of U.S. forces that had been killed in action up to that date. The insurgents continue to succeed in intimidating their fellow Sunnis. There is no way to count or fully assess the pattern of such low-level attacks, or separate them from crime or Shiite reprisals, but no one doubts that they remain a major problem.

Suicide attacks have increased and killed and wounded Iraqis in large numbers. The number of car bombs rose from 420 in 2004 to 873 in 2005, and the number of suicide car bombs rose from 133 to 411, and the number of suicide vest attacks rose from seven in 2004 to 67 in 2005. In case after case, Shiite civilians and Sunnis cooperating with the government were successfully targeted in ways designed to create a serious civil war.

The use of roadside bombs (improvised explosive devices IEDs) remains a major problem for U.S. and other coalition forces. The total number of IED attacks nearly doubled from 5,607 in 2004 to 10,953 in 2005. While the success rate of IED attacks dropped significantly, by 25 to 30 percent in 2004 to 10 percent in 2005, they still had a major impact. During 2005, there were 415 IED deaths out of a total of 674 combat deaths, or 61.6 percent of all combat deaths. IEDs accounted for 4,256 wounded out of a total of 5,941, some 71.6 percent of the wounded. From July 2005 to January 2006, IEDs killed 234 U.S. service members out of a total of 369 total combat deaths, or 63.4 percent. They accounted for 2314 wounded out of 2,980 total combat wounded, or 77.7 percent.

To put these numbers in perspective, IEDs caused 900 deaths out of a total of 1,748 combat deaths, or 51.5 percent during the entire post-Saddam fall from March 2003 and January 2006. IEDs caused 9,327 wounded out of a total of 16,606 or 56.2 percent. However, the numbers of personnel killed and wounded by IEDs are scarcely the only measure of insurgent success. Casualties may have dropped but the number of attacks has gone up. IED attacks tie down manpower and equipment, disrupt operations, disrupt economic and aid activity, and interact with attacks on Iraqi civilians and forces to limit political progress and help try to provoke civil war.

Insurgents carried out more than 300 attacks on Iraqi oil facilities between March 2003 and January 2006. The end result was that oil production dropped by 8 percent in 2005, and pipeline shipments through the Iraqi northern pipeline to Ceyan in Turkey dropped from 800,000 barrels per day before the war to an average of 40,000 barrels per day in 2005. In July 2005, Iraqi officials estimated that insurgent attacks had already cost Iraq some $11 billion. They had kept Iraqi oil production from approaching the 3 million barrel a day goal in 2005 goal that the coalition had set after the fall of Saddam Hussein, and production had dropped from prewar levels of around 2.5 million barrels a day to an average of 1.83 million barrels a day in 2005, to 1.57 million barrels a day in December 2005. These successes have major impact in a country where 94 percent of the government's direct income now comes from oil exports.

The impact of such attacks has compounded the ability of insurgents to steal oil and fuel. The New York Times has quoted Ali Allawi, Iraq's finance minister, as estimating that insurgents were taking some 40 percent to 50 percent of all oil-smuggling profits in the country, and had infiltrated senior management positions at the major northern refinery in Baji: "It's gone beyond Nigeria levels now where it really threatens national security …The insurgents are involved at all levels." The Times also quoted an unidentified U.S. official as saying that "It's clear that corruption funds the insurgency, so there you have a very real threat to the new state … Corruption really has the potential of undercutting the growth potential here." The former oil minister Ibrahim Bahr al-Ulum had said earlier in 2005 that "oil and fuel smuggling networks have grown into a dangerous mafia threatening the lives of those in charge of fighting corruption."

In short, there are cycles in an evolving struggle but not signs that the struggle is being lost or won. For example, the number of attacks peaked to some 700 per week in October 2005, before the October 15 referendum to the constitution to 430 per week in mid January, but this was more a function of insurgent efforts to peak operations in sensitive periods than any outcome of the fighting. Similarly, the number of U.S. killed has averaged some 65 per month since March 2003. The total of U.S. soldiers killed was 96 in October 2005, 84 in November, 68 in December and 63 in January 2006. This reflected shifts in the cycles of attacks and in their targets. U.S. experts estimated that some 500 Iraqis were killed between the December 15, 2005 elections and mid January 2006.

There have, as yet, been no decisive trends or no tipping points: simply surges and declines. This, however, does not mean the counterinsurgency campaign cannot be won. Much of the reason the insurgency continues is that Iraqi forces are not yet deployed in the strength to replace coalition troops and demonstrate the legitimacy of the Iraqi government in the field.

The Impact of the Political Process on Iraqi Force Development

Success in developing Iraq's forces interacts with success in creating a more stable and inclusive political system. In fact, the political dimension of force development has become increasingly important, as Iraq has taken over primary responsibility for its own destiny. The December 15, 2005, election changed the political landscape of Iraq in ways whose impact is currently impossible to determine but will play a critical role in determining the success or failure of the Iraqi force development effort.

The final results for the December 15, 2005, elections gave the Sunnis significant representation, in spite of complaints about fraud. The new Council of Representatives had 275 seats and the final results for the election, which were certified on February 9, 2006, gave the main parties the following number of seats: Iraq Alliance (Shiites) 128 seats; Kurdish coalition 53; the Iraqi List (Secular "Allawi list") 25; Iraqi Accordance Front (Sunnis) 44; Iraqi front for National Dialogue (Sunni) 11. The Shiite coalition won 47 percent of the 275 seats; the Kurdish coalition won 19 percent, the two main Sunni parties won 20 percent, and Allawi's secular nationalists (with significant Sunni support) won 9 percent.

If the election results in an inclusive national political structure that gives Iraq's Sunnis incentives to join the government and political process, many current Iraqi Sunni insurgents are likely to end their participation in the insurgency and the more extreme elements will be defeated. The risk, of course, is that either Iraqi forces will not be successful, or that the political process will fail.

It may be the fall of 2006 before the full impact of the December 15, 2005, election in Iraq is clear. It will certainly be months before the full nature of the new political structure it has created has been negotiated and every element of the new government is in place. There is still some risk that significant numbers of Sunnis will not accept the result, or that some combination of the insurgency and tension between Sunni and Shiite may divide the country.

So far, the election has not unified Iraqis or defused the insurgency. The Iraqi Electoral Commission and outside observers have concluded that electoral abuses were minor, and that the elections were fair. However, there is still a serious risk that Iraq will divide or experience a more intense and overt form of civil war.

Iraqi public opinion is deeply divided along ethnic and sectarian lines, and this large amount of unity threatens Iraq's ability to create an inclusive and effective government. A poll of Iraqis conducted after the election in early January 2006 found that while some 66 percent of all Iraqis polled thought the elections were fair, this was not a meaningful picture of how Iraqis felt in ethnic and sectarian terms. While 89 percent of Iraqi Arab Shiites thought it was fair, as did 77 percent of Iraqi Kurds, only 5 percent of the Sunnis polled agreed. Put differently, only 33 percent of all Iraqis, 11 percent of Arab Shiites and 19 percent of Kurds thought the elections were not fair, but 94 percent of Arab Sunnis did feel they were unfair.

Iraqis felt much the same about the prospects for the new government. A total of 68 percent of all Iraqis, 90 percent of Arab Shiites, and 81 percent of Kurds thought the new government would be legitimate, but only 6 percent of Arab Sunnis did. While only 31 percent of all Iraqis, 10 percent of Arab Shiites, and 15 percent of Kurds thought the new government would not be legitimate, 92 percent of Arab Sunnis agreed.

Iraqis disagree over more than the election and the future government. When they were asked whether ousting Saddam was worth the cost and suffering caused by the war and its aftermath, 77 percent of all Iraqis, 98 percent of Arab Shiites, and 91 percent of Kurds thought the new government would be legitimate, but only 13 percent of Arab Sunnis believed that. While only 22 percent of all Iraqis, 10 percent of Arab Shiites and 15 percent of Kurds thought the ousting Saddam was not worth it, but 83 percent of Arab Sunnis agreed. In a similar vein, 64 percent of all Iraqis, 84 percent of Arab Shiites, and 76 percent of Kurds thought Iraq was moving in the right direction, but only 6 percent of Arab Sunnis did. A total of 93 percent of Iraqi Arab Sunnis thought that Iraq was moving in the wrong direction.

Political stability requires effective Iraqi forces, but political instability could easily divide the new Iraqi forces, converting them into largely Shiite and Kurdish units and pushing out Sunnis -- potentially as part of the insurgency. It has again exposed both the fact that Iraqi force development is totally dependent on Iraqi political success, and that successful force development must pay as much attention to internal politics and the political nature of an insurgency as to force effectiveness. It has also shown that any effort to develop effective military forces must be matched by an effort to develop effective security and police forces and ones that will not ally themselves with militias or other irregular forces that can divide the country.

These issues again are reflected in Iraqi opinion polls conducted in early 2006. The coalition forces had very uncertain popularity in Iraq, a result consistent with all previous polls from late 2003 onward. Some 47 percent of all Iraqis approved attacks on U.S.-led forces, versus 7 percent approving attacks on Iraqi forces and roughly 1 percent approving attacks on Iraqi civilians. Some 41 percent of Arab Shiites, 16 percent of Kurds and 88 percent of Arab Sunnis approved of attacks on U.S. led forces.

Almost all Iraqis wanted U.S.-led forces to leave Iraq: 35 percent wanted withdrawal by July 2006, and 70 percent wanted withdrawal in two years. Once again, however, there are striking differences. Only 22 percent of Arab-Shiites wanted the United States to withdraw in six months, although 71 percent wanted withdrawal in two years. Some 13 percent of Kurds wanted the United States to withdraw in six months, and only 40 percent wanted withdrawal in two years. In the case of Sunnis, however, 83 percent wanted the United States out in six months and 94 percent in two years. When the question was asked differently, Iraqis seemed somewhat less divided. A total of 29 percent were willing to wait and only reduce U.S. forces when the situation improved in the field. This included 29 percent of Arab Shiites, 57 percent of Kurds and 29 percent of Arab Sunnis. This at least in part reflected concerns about the quality of Iraqi forces.

Iraqis praised the U.S. force development effort more than they praised any other aspect of the U.S. assistance effort, but such praise was relative. Only 33 percent believed the U.S. was doing a good job. Another 44 percent approved but thought the US was doing a poor job, and 23 percent disapproved. Again, major differences occurred by sect and ethnicity: Some 54 percent of Kurds felt the U.S. was doing a good job, 42 percent approved but thought the U.S. was doing a poor job, and only 9 percent disapproved. In the case of Arab Shiites, however, only 37 percent felt the U.S. was doing a good job, 52 percent approved but thought the U.S. was doing a poor job, and 11 percent disapproved. And, in the case of Arab Sunnis, only 6 percent felt the U.S. was doing a good job, 20 percent approved but thought the US was doing a poor job, and 74 percent disapproved.

As a result, Iraqis had very mixed views about how soon Iraqi forces would be ready to take over the mission. The poll found that 35 percent of all Iraqis wanted U.S. led forces to withdraw in six months (83 percent Sunnis), and 35 percent more in two years (11 percent Sunnis). However, only 39 percent felt Iraqi forces were ready to deal with security challenges on their own (38 percent Sunni). A total of 21 percent felt Iraqi forces would need help from outside forces for another year (21 percent Sunnis). A total of 26 percent felt Iraqi forces would need help from outside forces for two years (31 percent Sunnis), and a total of 12 percent felt Iraqi forces would need help from outside forces for three years or more (5 percent Sunnis).

The good news for both Iraq's political and force development is that there is far more unity about avoiding attacks on Iraqi forces and civilians. Only 7 percent of Iraqis approved attacks on Iraqi forces and 93 percent disapproved. Even among Sunnis, only 24 percent "approved somewhat," and 76 percent disapproved, of which 24 percent disapproved strongly. When it came to attacks on Iraqi civilians, only 7 percent of Iraqis approved attacks on Iraqi forces and 99 percent disapproved. So few Sunnis approved that the results in these categories were not meaningful, while nearly 100 percent disapproved, of which 95 percent disapproved strongly.

The end result is that 2006 is a year that can see both successful political compromise and major further progress in developing Iraqi forces, or see the division of the country and Iraq's forces. Success can be relative. Virtually any form of compromise that most Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and other minorities can accept is good enough to be defined as "success." Any force development effort that avoids the division of the regular armed forces, ends most abuses in the Ministry of the Interior and security forces, makes the police more professional and neutral, and gradually limits the role of the militias will also be success.

It has become all too apparent that "victory" for the coalition will be defined as the successful Iraq application of the art of compromise, and that the goal of "transforming" Iraq into some shining example to the region was always little more than a neoconservative hope. Iraq may well end in becoming a stable and unified nation, with a strong degree of pluralism and a far stronger rule of law and protection of human rights. This future, however, is still years in the future, and it never made sense to assume that Iraq's example would impact heavily on progress in other Middle Eastern states. In the real world, progress occurs one nation at a time.