Dividing Iraq: First, Think Long and Hard
May 1, 2006 — -- As sectarian violence continues in Iraq, Sen. Joseph Biden, D-Del., argues that Iraq should be divided into three separate regions: Kurdish, Shiite and Sunni, with a central government in Baghdad.
It is easy to call for dividing Iraq as if that could somehow solve the nation's problems and allow the United States to exit. There are some lobbyists calling for Kurdish independence or autonomy who see such calls as the road to success. The Unites States needs to think long and hard before it supports such a policy. Civil war and division may be inevitable, but the results could be anything but pleasant:
Sectarian and ethnic cleansing: Iraq does not have a neat set of ethnic dividing lines. There has never been a meaningful census of Iraq that shows exactly how its Arab Sunnis, Arab Shiites, Kurds and other factions divide or where they are located. Recent elections have made it clear, however, that its cities and 18 governorates all have significant minorities, and any effort to divide the country would require massive relocations.
Moreover, Iraq is heavily urbanized, with nearly 40 percent of the population in the divided Baghdad and Mosul areas, Kirkuk already a powder keg, and Basra the subject of Shiite Islamist "cleansing." Northern Ireland and the Balkans have already shown how difficult it is to split cities, and with Iraq's centralized, failing infrastructure and impoverished economy, violence and economics cannot be separated.
The army and security forces: The regular military has held together so far, but it is largely Shiite with a large number of Kurds. The Ministry of Interior forces are largely Shiite, and the police are hopelessly mixed with militia and local security forces that divide according to tribal, sectarian, and ethnic ties. Dividing the country essentially means dividing the army and security forces, creating local forces on sectarian and ethnic lines, and reinforcing the militias -- all-leading to more violence.
Oil and money: More than 90 percent of Iraq's native government revenues come from oil exports. The Sunni Arab west has no present oil revenues. The Kurds want the northern oil fields but have no real claim to them and no secure way to export. The Shiite south is also divided, with the Shiites in Basra talking about their own area separate from many other Shiites that would control the oil in the south.
Once the nation effectively divides, so does its major resource and in ways that make the territorial losers in nonoil areas effectively dysfunctional. The central government cannot preside over a divided nation and hope to control oil and the nation's infrastructure and export facilities at the same time. This leaves the losers with little choice other than further conflict.
Foreign linkages: Neo-Salafi Sunni Islamist extremist groups with ties to al Qaeda already have come to dominate the Sunni insurgents. If Iraq divides, either they will dominate the Iraqi Arab Sunnis, or Arab Sunni states like Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia will be forced to do so, and they may well end in competing. Iran will compete for the Shiites and exploit the power vacuum if the United States leaves. The Kurds have no friends: Turkey, Iran and Syria will all threaten and attempt to divide and exploit them.
The United States has made serious mistakes in Iraq, and Iraq may well divide on its own. A strategy of dividing Iraq, however, is virtually certain to make things worse, not better, and confront the United States with massive new problems in an area with some 60 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and 37 percent of its gas. Even if one ignores the fact the United States effectively broke Iraq and its responsibilities to some 28 million Iraqis, a violent power vacuum in an already dangerous region is not a strategy, it is simply an abdication of both moral responsibility and the national interest.