A Looming Civil War in Palestine?

— -- The past weeks have seen an unprecedented and ominous deterioration in the internal Palestinian security situation. The 'red line' of Palestinians never shedding Palestinian blood has been crossed, and for the first time in their tragic and tumultuous history, Palestinians are facing the prospect of a civil war and the death of the dream of a Palestinian state. At least 20 Palestinians have died in factional clashes in the past month.

Until now, despite the expected political divisions characterizing any society, Palestinians had remained united despite the most challenging of circumstances, chief among them a 40-year Israeli occupation that controlled every aspect of their lives.

The defeat of the secular Fatah party in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections set the stage for more fundamental splits in Palestinian society and a deteriorating internal security situation. Frustrated by Fatah's corruption and inability to deliver on Palestinian statehood, the Palestinian people punished Fatah by voting Hamas into power. Hamas, while never in power or even part of the political system, had nevertheless garnered increased support among Palestinians for essentially being the 'anti-Fatah.' It was clean, disciplined, and delivered on many of the social services that Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority was supposed to but had not.

The taking over of the reins of Palestinian governance by Hamas exposed the fundamental ideological difference between it and the PLO, the umbrella Palestinian organization dominated by Fatah, of which Hamas is not a part. For Hamas, armed resistance to the Israeli occupation is valid, including suicide bombings against Israeli civilians in response to Palestinian civilian deaths. Political negotiations might begin, but only after Israel withdrew completely from Palestinian land occupied since 1967, since political negotiations with Israel prior to that have proven to be fruitless.

The PLO on the other hand, now headed by Palestinian president Abbas, had foresworn the use of violence as a tool to end the occupation and advocated political negotiations with Israel as the only way to end the occupation and achieve Palestinian statehood. The use of violence, whether sanctioned by international law or not, is not in Palestinian interests on any number of levels.

With Hamas in power barely 5 months, the Palestinian situation has considerably worsened. A number of factors have contributed to this. An international sanctions regime is in effect against the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (PA) government for its refusal to meet the three conditions set by the international community for aid; recognizing Israel's existence, recognizing past Israeli-Palestinian agreements, and renouncing the use of violence. The result is that the PA has been unable to pay salaries or deliver basic services to the Palestinian population.

Fatah, after refusing to join Hamas in a coalition government and unhappy with its electoral loss, is behaving as if still in power. It is using its overwhelming presence in the civil service and security forces to hinder Hamas' ability to govern. Hamas on the other hand, unprepared for its electoral triumph, is behaving as if still in opposition, invoking steadfastness as a substitute for policy and introducing provocative measures of its own.

Even as Hamas and Fatah leaders repeatedly profess their determination to avoid violent conflict, they are both using low-level violence on the streets as they jockey for power.

The latest manifestation of this jockeying is the issue of a referendum on what has become known as the 'Prisoner's Document.' This is an 18-point plan drawn up by Palestinian prisoners of all factions in Israeli jails, Hamas and Fatah included. Given the almost mythic status of Palestinian prisoners in Palestinian society, this document carries much weight. Calling among other things for a Palestinian state in the territories occupied by Israel since 1967, its importance is in the recognition of Israel this implies. Sensing the political opportunity this creates for restarting negotiations and addressing the sanctions against Palestinians, Abbas has adopted the document and called on Hamas to accept it or put the document to a referendum, issuing a presidential degree for a July 26 vote if Hamas demurs. Surveys have shown over 80% of Palestinians support a referendum and would vote 'Yes' for the document. Hamas has balked, perceiving this as a vote against its legitimacy and in response initiated a parliamentary motion declaring the July 26 referendum illegal. The vote on that motion has been postponed until July 20, with both sides realizing that the brinkmanship is creating a momentum of violence on the streets that is on the verge of spiraling out of control.

The coming days may prove to be a critical turning point for Palestinians. Will their historic national unity prevail or will the issue of the referendum light the match of wide-scale internal conflict? It is critical that Palestinians realize that a civil war would be a humanitarian disaster and would increase support in Israel and worldwide for Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's plan to unilaterally draw new Israeli-Palestinian borders in Israel's favor.

More importantly, a civil war will mean that the Palestinian national project for statehood will be dead and buried.