A North Korea Missile Test: Background and Fast Facts
July 5, 2006 -- What is happening at the United Nations Security Council?
The 15 members of the Security Council met in closed consultations today to discuss North Korea's launch of at least seven short, medium and long-range missiles and how to respond. Based on statements to the media before and after the consultations, there was unanimous condemnation of North Korea's actions, but somewhat less than full consensus on what to do about it.
Japan, the United States and United Kingdom have tabled a draft resolution prohibiting the transfer of "financial resources, items, materials, goods and technologies" to any end users who could "contribute to the DPRK's missile and other weapons programs."
Russia and China called for Presidential Statements as a first step before adopting a resolution mandating punitive measures. These issues will be discussed in New York today and in capitals tomorrow.
What do North Korea's tests mean?
It will be interesting to read what, if anything, North Korea reports to its own citizens about the missile launches, in particular the failed launch of the Taepodong 2, which broke up over the Sea of Japan shortly after launch.
On the basis of these launches, North Korea's missile program is still a work in progress, though missile experts point out that there is still a great deal for North Korean scientists to learn from failed launches. Anthony Cordesman, ABC News consultant, states: "It is easy to dismiss such actions on the grounds they are 'irrational' or will 'backfire.' It is far from clear that this is the case. Testing a large number of missiles at once makes good sense from a North Korean perspective. It gets everything done at one, rather than staggers out the political cost over weeks or months. It prevents preemption of future tests. It tends to bury the fact a major series of short/medium range tests took place under the impact of the longer-range test, and the success of the shorter range missile tests guarded against the possible failure of the test of the larger, long-range missile."
Can the Taepodong 2 missile reach the United States?
Yes. In theory, a three-stage missile launched with a light enough payload could reach the United States. However, The Taepodong 2 has never been flight tested, so little definitive can be said about its performance. The missile failed 42 seconds into the test on July 4, and North Korea's previous test of a three-stage rocket, in 1998, also failed. The longest range missile currently in North Korea's arsenal is the No Dong, with a range of 1300 km, capable of reaching targets only in Northeast Asia.
Can the United States intercept the Taepodong 2?
Possibly. The United States currently has a total of 11 ground-based interceptors as part of a test program for ballistic missile defense. Nine of these are based at Fort Greely, Alaska, and two at Vandenberg Air Base, Calif. Test results, however, have been mixed. Of 10 attempted intercepts, only five have been successful, the most recent in October 2002.
Can North Korea deploy a nuclear warhead onto the Taepodong?
The United States does not know. Putting a nuclear payload onto a warhead introduces a new set of technical constraints and limitations on range. What little is known of North Korea's nuclear weapons does not indicate that they are small enough to be carried on its missiles, although the Taepodong 2 is significantly larger than its predecessors.
In testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee on Feb. 16, 2005, Assistant Secretary Thomas Fingar stated that "North Korea has produced sufficient fissile material to make a small number of nuclear weapons, but … there is no evidence that it has produced such weapons and mated them to a missile capable of delivering them to the United States." However, on April 28, 2005, in answer to a question from Sen. Clinton at a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Vice Adm. Lowell F. Jacoby, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, stated that in his assessment, North Korea did have the capability to arm a missile with a nuclear warhead.
What did North Korea's 1998 test demonstrate?
On Aug. 31, 1998, the DPRK launched what was initially believed to be a two-stage, but later confirmed to be a three-stage, rocket. It crashed in the Pacific Ocean before reaching Earth's orbit. Later, analysts determined that it was a failed attempt to launch a satellite. North Korea claimed that the satellite launch was a success, with "revolutionary slogans" being beamed back to Earth.
The CIA was caught by surprise: In a December 1998 speech, the CIA's Bob Walpole said: "The August launch used what we had called the Taepodong 1 medium-range missile, but it had an unanticipated third stage. Although the North Koreans failed to place their satellite into orbit, they tested some important aspects of ICBM development and flight, such as multiple stage separation, roughly on the timetable we expected, but using a vehicle configuration we had not anticipated. The existence of the third stage concerns us. First, we had not included it in our earlier projections; neither had outside experts looking at our intelligence. Second, it and potentially larger third stages have significant implications for the Taepodong 2. Third, it raises many proliferation concerns. We are continuing to conduct more analysis on it, trying to identify more about it, including its capabilities and why it failed."
What's the significance of the missile's different stages?
The more stages a rocket has, the greater its potential range. Each stage can be considered a rocket in itself, with its own propellant and engine. When one stage's fuel burns out, its engine can shut down, allowing that stage to drop away so that the remaining rockets/stages have less mass to carry.
What's the difference between a missile and a launch vehicle?
Very little. Both missiles and launch vehicles are types of rockets. Missiles have warheads, while launch vehicles are used to put satellites or other payloads into the earth's orbit.
Jacqueline Shire is a Senior Analyst with the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) and consultant to ABC News; Astrid Hill is an intern at ABC News' Investigative Unit and student at Brown University.
John Pike of www.GlobalSecurity.org provided valuable assistance with the preparation of this material.