What's Ahead for Israel
July 26, 2006 — -- Israel's two-front war with the forces of Islamist extremism is taking place against a Middle East and international backdrop that is near-revolutionary. The region is split along radical-moderate and Shiite-Sunni lines.
Iran, exploiting American mistakes, has spearheded a Shiite revival. Iran and Syria together are leading the radical camp. The traditional Sunni Arab powers, Egypt and particularly Saudi Arabia, are encouraging Israel to proceed and cut Hezbollah down to size, thereby delivering a setback to Iran and Syria; Egypt is again trying to mediate a cease-fire and prisoner release agreement with Hamas in Gaza, on conditions advantageous to Israel.
The international community, led by the United States, is delaying intervention in the hope that Israel's strategy in Lebanon will pay off, despite the massive destruction of infrastructure and humanitarian suffering in that country. (Not surprisingly, both Iran and Saudi Arabia are poised to pay for Lebanon's recovery.) When the war ends, a non-United Nations international force of some sort is almost certain to replace the Israeli Defense Forces in southern Lebanon.
After nearly two weeks of war in Lebanon, and even longer on the Gaza front, we can begin to identify those broad areas where Israel should and should not develop new strategies.
Beginning with what not to do: Israel cannot and should not try to impose a "new order" on Lebanon or, for that matter, on the region. Israel's contribution is to strike a first, serious blow at the forces of radical Islam surrounding it on two fronts. But any Israeli attempt to lead in a regional political sense will be counterproductive. The less said by Israel about changing the region, the better.
On the other hand, the current conflagration does provide a unique opportunity for Israel to quietly draw closer to the moderate Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia, on key strategic issues. It is no coincidence that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert wants Arab states to participate in a multinational force in Lebanon. In this regard, it is now imperative that Israel and the moderate Sunni states also quietly confront the United States with the consequences of its precipitous democratic reform policies in the region: the enfranchisement of radical Islamists, mainly Shiite, and the strengthening of Iran. Israel is currently paying the price for this mistake (though it contributed with mistakes of its own as well); it's hoped that it is undoing some of the damage.
But Washington, too, has to be brought into a more active role in this regard.
Looking at the new Iranian and Shiite-led radical bloc as a whole, Syria is the weak link. It is a Sunni majority country with a problematic Alawite regime that finds its interests threatened on all fronts, and that in recent years has repeatedly asked to reopen a peace process with Israel. Now may be the time to take up Bashar Assad's offer. Talks with Syria could be key not only to neutralizing Hezbollah but to weakening Hamas. Here, too, Washington will have to be persuaded that its pressure on Israel to shun such an option is no longer useful.
Turning to Gaza, where the regional Arab Sunni weakness is also Palestinian weakness, we should be looking, with Egyptian help, for a separate cease-fire. That effort is being hampered by Palestinian factionalism. One way or another, we have to compartmentalize the strategically more significant Lebanese front and deflate Hassan Nasrallah's aspiration to represent the Palestinians. Cease-fires would also enable Israel to get back to the business of withdrawal from heavily populated Palestinian areas, including parts of East Jerusalem.
Some will argue that the provocative violations of Israeli sovereignty on the Gaza and Lebanese borders that launched this war are proof that Israel's unilateral withdrawals on those fronts were counterproductive. The outcome of this war must prove them wrong. For starters, the strong public backing for the war effort -- indeed, the public's readiness to absorb considerable civilian losses against an enemy bent on our ultimate destruction -- is a direct consequence of the fact that the war began on sovereign Israeli territory rather than onoccupied lands, and that Israel has begun the process of consolidating demographically to ensure that it remains a Jewish and democratic state. Israeli success in bringing this war to a favorable end, coupled with Israeli domestic unity on the war issue, are the best guarantee that next time our deterrent will be respected.-
Yossi Alpher is co-editor of the Bitterlemons Family of Internet Publications. He is a former director of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University and a former senior adviser to Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak.