Analysis: The U.N. Military Role in Iraq

Sept. 3, 2003 -- Asking the U.N.to play a military role in Iraq may or may not be part of the solution.

The basic problem is that the United Nations has no forces of its own, and each U.N. command and multinational force has to be built up in a different way and around a different mission.

The fact that a U.N. flag flies over the result does not mean that it represents anything other than a coalition operation with all of the military problems involved.

The United Nations could provide powerful political cover. A U.N. operation clearly is not an occupation. It would reassure many Iraqis and other nations that the nation-building operation has become international, will not represent some effort to impose U.S. views on Iraq, and will transition to full Iraqi sovereignty as soon as possible.

At the same time, a U.N. multinational force under U.S. control is not a U.N. operation. This has been clear ever since the Korean War, and few nations can be unaware of the end result in the Balkans.

Iraqis may well see such a multinational force as nothing more than an extension of a U.S. occupation by other means. Certainly, those Iraqis who now attack U.S. forces will have no incentive to stop their attacks, and those Islamists — like al Qaeda — who attack the United Nations on ideological grounds are scarcely going to shift positions.

As a result, unless the U.N. resolution broadens the United Nations' nation-building mandate as well, the political facts on the ground in Iraq, and the alignments of hostile forces, are not going to change. The shift will rather be to a "coalition of the willing" under a blue flag.

Paying in Blood or Dollars

This immediately raises the question of who is the new " willing," although the phrase "more willing" may apply better to the military reality.

In effect, Washington is asking for help from those who have largely refused help earlier, and doing so at a time it is clearly in trouble and any forces contributed can become a target all over Iraq.

It is hardly surprising that many countries may insist on terms and conditions the United States does not want, if they agree at all.

Certainly, they are not going to want to have to pay for U.S. mistakes in either blood or dollars or risk serious casualties. This, however, may mean trying to share command — at least to the extent of national vetoes on major operations, veto power over any use of their forces, consensus on overall rules of engagement, and the creation of defined roles and missions — and zones of engagement — that protect various national contingents.

Coming Together Under the Blue Flag

These are not unacceptable conditions if nations are willing to work together. Many areas in Iraq are secure enough so the risks consist largely of limited attacks, bombings, and other terrorist risks — rather than combat. This lends itself to regional security missions, where the main goals are to provide security for the Iraqis, ensure the flow of goods and services, and protect nation-building.

If the resulting national contingents consist of mature troops with suitable security training and some area and language skills, the forces involved may well be welcomed as an alternative to both Saddam/extremists and the United States.

The creation of national area responsibilities will get around many language problems (32 countries with 29 languages are already supporting Washington), interoperability, and command and control problems.

Creating a Coherent Approach

Even this mission, however requires more than small token contingents. It takes significant force density for such operations to work, and more small forces will simply present more coordination problems.

Creating a coherent approach to area security in even one major area requires thousands of troops, and protecting relatively secure governorates could require coherent national forces of 5,000-10,000. These forces would also have to have the proper training and skill levels and be willing to fight — not just act as "peace keepers."

Such missions will still leave the United States and Britain with virtually all of the offensive missions and Washington with the problem of defending most or all of the threatened areas in central Iraq.

This in some ways is inevitable. Iraq requires the kind of complex counterinsurgency operation that, in turn, requires joint, integrated, and cohesive operations.

It requires unity of command, secure intelligence, and real-time reaction capability without debates and consensus building. As a result, a U.N. multinational force would allow the U.S. and Britain to concentrate on the fighting and increase force density in the most threatened areas. It would not ease the problems in fighting a war after the war.

Potential Liabilities

Putting the political issue of how well additional countries will actually be willing to cooperate with the United States aside, it is not clear how many countries will be willing and able to provide the size and type of forces needed.

Contributing countries also have to know that sending troops to Iraq means at least some casualties, and that the situation is volatile enough so a national contingent may enter at a point the fighting spreads to include the Shiites or include ethnic violence in the north.

At a minimum, most countries are going to insist that the U.S. pay most costs and provide logistic and other support. If not, they are going to want something else for their contribution.

Some potential contributions also involve significant potential liabilities in this kind of asymmetric war:

Turkey is so involved in the Kurdish issue that its motives will always will be suspect, and has the additional liabilities of fears of Turkish ambitions in the north, ambitions relating to Iraqi oil, and having been a previous occupying power.

India is confronting Pakistan and is seen as anti-Islamic because of Kashmir. If it supports the United States, this will inevitably lead to new problems in Pakistan and Afghanistan over the fear of some kind of U.S.-Indian deal.

Jordan quietly supported the United States in the Iraq War, and faces enough problems because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Southern Gulf powers have little military capability and will be seen as pro-Arab and pro-Sunni.

Iran and Syria are off the board.

Egypt's media have been harshly anti-U.S. and anti-war. Egypt again will be seen as a "Sunni" power.

France will find imposing conditions almost irresistible. France also has its own ambitions in the region and has dealt with the Iraqi Baath Party and pro-Saddam supporters in the past.

Germany has called for a U.N. role, but said any troops should be from the region.

Moreover, even if the U.S. can find the right kind of new forces, it will still take weeks and/or months to establish a series of new national presences that are in place, properly supported, and familiar enough with the Iraqis they must work with to be effective. The benefits will not be quick.

Finally, the high costs of the "war after the war" will continue. Even if the United States can find forces to support the kind of multinational missions it needs, it is far from clear that this means any short- or mid-term savings in costs, a major near-term reduction in casualties, or that Washington will have relief from some $50-$100 billion-plus in additional nation-building costs during 2004-2005.

Other nations may well help in providing more support for nation building, but nothing about far more popular nation-building efforts in the past indicates that any additions to the list of nations already helping the United States will provide serious money by the standards required for either military operations or nation-building.