Former CIA Agent: al-Libbi Arrest 'Good Victory'

May 4, 2005 -- -- Former CIA operative Gary Schroen led the hunt for Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks. Schoen, who has chronicled that mission in a new book, "First In: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan," spoke with "Nightline's" Ted Koppel to discuss the war on terror.

The following is an excerpt of their conversation, focusing on today's announcement that suspected senior al Qaeda leader Abu Farraj al-Libbi was captured in Pakistan. President Bush called the capture a "critical victory" against al Qaeda.

KOPPEL: The Pakistanis today captured a man who is believed to be the number three man in al Qaeda.

(CROSSTALK)

SCHROEN: Mr. al-Libbi.

KOPPEL: Libbi.

SCHROEN: The Libyan.

If indeed he is the fellow they captured, it's a very, very significant arrest and a good victory for us.

He took over after Khalid Sheik Mohammed was captured as the key planner, and is credited with two assassination -- of planning two assassination attempts against President Musharraf of Pakistan.

The fact that he was captured in the Bashour (ph) tribal district I think is significant.

KOPPEL: It's right along the border with Afghanistan?

SCHROEN: It's along the border of Afghanistan, but north of Peshawar, far north of Waziristan, where we have been looking for bin Laden.

And I have for years thought that, that was the area that bin Laden would have chosen to hide, and I think because it is a rugged, really rough area where the tribals hate any form of government, Pakistani or U.S. or Afghan, and would be perfectly willing to support someone of bin Laden's caliber and with a checkbook of his size, and I believed he's been up there.

So the capture in Bashour (ph) I think is significant.

KOPPEL: Assuming that you are right, and assuming that this man now provides some confirmation of that, is there enough money, enough willingness both on the U.S. government's part and on the Pakistani government's part to go in with adequate forces to get him?

SCHROEN: I must say that the Pakistani's arrest of al-Libbi in that area surprised me, pleasantly surprised me, because I had a distinct feeling that the Pakistanis weren't that anxious to go after bin Laden.

KOPPEL: Especially the security services.

SCHROEN: Especially the security services.

The potential blow back for actually having the Pakistani government arrest or bring to justice or allow him to be -- bin Laden to be killed would be -- could be tremendous...

(CROSSTALK)

KOPPEL: When you say potential blow back, they've tried to assassinate the president twice. What greater blow back can you have than that?

SCHROEN: Well, Pakistan's fundamentalist religious parties now are -- actually control the seats in both the Northwest Frontier Province and in Balochistan. They can put 100,000 people on the street to demonstrate against the government with great ease if they so desire, and it could really work to destabilize the government in Pakistan should someone of the caliber of bin Laden be captured with the help of the government.

KOPPEL: You suggest that the U.S. government really needs to be more supportive of Musharraf and the Pakistani government, that we should provide the F-16s that we promised to sell them that they have actually already paid for, give them more money.

Even with all of that assistance, would that put Musharraf in a stronger position than to do what you've already suggested might result in almost a national uprising, or at least a regional uprising?

SCHROEN: It would help solidify the support of the Pakistani military behind Musharraf. If the Pakistani military were receiving this kind of aid, and substantial aid, that would help because you have to always keep in mind that Pakistan's greatest enemy is still India, and that no matter what happens elsewhere, that the army stands facing India and ready to defend the country.

And so boosting Pakistan's military would help I think solidify support behind Musharraf to face an internal uprising.

KOPPEL: In the final analysis, do you think that either the United States or its Pakistani allies every will capture bin Laden?

SCHROEN: I'm convinced we will.

I think this arrest of al-Libbi in Bashour (ph) is significant. And if we can get Pakistani support, I think we can get him within the next few months.

KOPPEL: Describe for me very quickly what you would do. If you were running the operation, what needs to be done? How many troops?

SCHROEN: We need to have put significant forces up north and move them from the -- I would think from the south up to the northern areas.

KOPPEL: What do you mean by "significant" forces?

SCHROEN: Well, several thousands, because it's a rugged, incredibly difficult area to operate in.

You need to get the Pakistanis to put people on the ground and to allow CIA officers to operate fairly openly in Bajurum (ph), Deer (ph) and Momand (ph), to create recruit sources and to develop the kind of intelligence that we need to pin this guy down.

KOPPEL: Do you think that's going to happen?

SCHROEN: God, I hope so.

KOPPEL: Gary Schroen, thanks very much. A fascinating story, and I appreciate your coming in.

SCHROEN: Thank you, Ted. A pleasure to be here.