Planned Obsolescence? Space Shuttle Program Winding Down

Sept. 20, 2006 — -- As the Space Shuttle Atlantis returns to Earth in the next day or so, every astronaut and much of the aerospace community is going to be distracted by the fact that the shuttle program is ending -- something the average American may not realize.

In fact, Atlantis and its remaining sister ships Discovery and Endeavor are scheduled to be parked for good by 2010, if not before.

The problem is that once they retire, the United States will have no way for several years to boost astronauts into low Earth orbit.

That glaring deficiency will change a few more years down the road when NASA's new combination system, to boost astronauts and heavy hardware using separate vehicles, comes into being (hopefully by 2014).

But the retirement of the shuttle fleet means an interim dependence on the Russian space program and a dangerous invitation to forget how and why the shuttle program failed to reach its intended goal in the first place.

It's true that the shuttle is an amazing design that can handle incredibly complex technical challenges.

But the fact that the shuttle fleet could have been so much better is a major, cautionary tale we absolutely must not forget or repeat.

The pivotal year was 1970, and even in the heady aftermath of the successful moon landings and the stunning abilities NASA had displayed with the Apollo program, Congress made it clear that the days of unlimited financial support for massive aerospace programs had come to an end.

In fact, convincing lawmakers to part with billions for manned spaceflight was clearly going to be a major uphill battle, given the beady-eyed, penurious congressional attitude that was forcing even the mighty NASA to dance for its dinner with every budget.

For one thing, NASA had been unceremoniously told by congressional leaders to forget about building a space station, even if the concept of building a reusable space "truck" still had a chance on the hill.

The key to gaining lawmakers' support, however, rested in designing something that could be all things to all people -- a manned spacecraft that could perform every mission the military and the civil sector might require, especially when it came to launching satellites for the intelligence community.

NASA, clearly understanding what song needed to be sung, grossly overpromised what it could produce, envisioning a shuttle fleet that could fly 50 times a year even though NASA's leaders knew very well that 20 times per year would be a major accomplishment.

It took 10 years before the program flew its first 50 missions.

In fact, myriad design requirements were thrust at NASA: The nation's intelligence requirements, for instance, dictated the shuttle have a large payload bay up to 60 feet long, while the military requirements demanded the ability to launch into a single polar orbit.

In order to deal with spy satellite requirements, the Air Force needed the shuttle to be able to launch from Vandenberg Air Force Base over the Pole and land at least at Edwards AFB north of Los Angeles, a feat that would require large wings and maneuverability as well as more fuel.

Can do, NASA replied, promising Congress that it could keep the price tag for the nation's planned omnibus space truck to $10 billion.

Congress approved the project but allotted only $5 billion, forcing significant engineering compromises that have dogged and haunted the shuttle ever since.

For one thing, the cheaper way to carry all that fuel was to use an external fuel tank, and thus the huge external tank with the problematic foam that still threatens every shuttle launch was born.

In addition, more power for more weight required either more money and engineering for internal rockets and tanks, or what some have derisively called the Rube Goldberg solution: two solid rocket boosters strapped like a giant afterthought to the outside.

With only half the money to spend and its shuttle performance characteristics already grossly overpromised, NASA did its best, hoping that the type of disasters that later destroyed both Challenger and Columbia would never occur.

The lesson in all this is very clear to the NASA of today, if not to Congress: Our next manned spaceflight system simply cannot be overpromised or underengineered to meet financial compromises.

Otherwise, NASA's new "Crew Excursion Vehicle" now scheduled to come on line in 2014 will inevitably reinforce philosopher George Santayana's caution: "He who cannot remember the past is doomed to repeat it."

The good news is that this time NASA's leaders seem ready to keep reality on the table and not let the monetary tail wag the engineering dog.

This is vital, even in the face of the usual collection of senators and congressmen who haven't a clue why America has a manned space program to begin with (a deficiency that will probably plague us forever).

What NASA has on the drawing board is not finalized, but the philosophy has changed greatly from the all-things-to-all-agencies approach of the 1970s.

Now, instead of trying to launch all manner of heavy equipment (such as the components of a larger space station or a moon base) along with the astronauts, the prevailing idea is to create separate systems for separate tasks.

Astronauts will go up in one type of vehicle designed for life support, safety, and emergency return capabilities far beyond the almost-nil emergency return abilities of the shuttle, while the heavy stuff will be shot up in larger, more traditional rockets and assembled on orbit.

There is a sad side to this, however, even if NASA is wildly successful with the new Crew Excursion Vehicle and all associated parts.

The "aeronautics" part of NASA's name is once again being ignored.

While one of the best of the original shuttle ideas envisioned a piggyback mother ship-spacecraft combination with later possibility of a single stage to orbit "space plane," our near-future manned spaceflight technology will continue to depend on vertical launches requiring mighty rocket engines, and essentially astronauts riding a controlled explosion into space.

Perhaps when all else has been considered, this is still the best solution, but for too long the possible aeronautical solutions have been left to dreamers like Burt Rutan, who successfully won the Ansari X prize more than two years ago by using a piggyback space/plane combination.

And as for those clueless congressionals?

Perhaps a reminder would be in order that the United States was not built by men wearing green eyeshades, but by dreamers with immense determination