U.S. Offers Iran Economic Incentives

March 11, 2005 — -- Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice announced today the United States will support two important incentives that Britain, France and Germany have sought to offer Iran in exchange for continuing its suspension of a uranium enrichment program.

The United States will consider "on a case-by-case basis" the licensing of spare parts for Iran's civilian aircraft, and allow discussion of Iran's accession to the World Trade Organization to go forward at WTO headquarters in Geneva. Iran is known to have a large and aging fleet of Boeing aircraft as well as Airbus planes whose engines may contain U.S.-licensed technology. Spare parts for either would require a U.S. export license.

Sirus Naseri, a senior Iranian diplomat involved with negotiations, dismissed today's announcement, calling the incentives "too insignificant to talk about."

A spokesperson for Boeing said the company will "take whatever business steps make the most sense" with respect to Iran only after the U.S. government modifies its current restrictions barring commercial transactions.

Britain, France and Germany have been engaged in negotiations with Iran since October 2003 aimed at ending Iran's uranium-enrichment program, which Iran voluntarily suspended in November 2004. Today's announcement marks a shift in U.S. policy toward Iran and a victory for European diplomats, who have long sought to persuade Washington that it must consider incentives as a way of prolonging Iran's suspension of its enrichment activities.

According to a senior administration official, the deal took shape at a March 1 dinner in London attended by Rice; Javier Solana, the European Union's foreign policy chief; and the foreign ministers of France, Germany and Britain.

Robert Einhorn, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and a former assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation, called this "a small step and far short of what the Europeans believe the U.S. must do to have any chance of getting the Iranians to give up their enrichment program."

"If it means that the Bush administration finally recognizes that it can no longer remain disengaged on the Iran nuclear issue, it is a welcome move," he said, adding, "It is an especially positive development if it means the U.S. and Europeans are now determined to pursue a common strategy involving both carrots and sticks."

According to a U.S. official familiar with the decision, the Bush administration may consider further incentives this summer if the suspension on enrichment activity holds and Iran remains in compliance with its commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Reportedly under consideration are expanded U.S.-Iranian diplomatic and people-to-people contacts, as well as reconsideration of the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.

The carrots come with conditions. U.S. and European officials are quick to note that any violation of the suspension agreement or Iran's broader obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty will be referred to the U.N. Security Council. The foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany issued a letter Thursday in anticipation of a March 16 meeting of EU foreign ministers, which states that in the event of failure by Iran to abide by the terms of its agreements, "we shall have no choice but to support referring Iran's nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council."

A deep well of skepticism toward Iran's nuclear intentions and capabilities remains in Washington. Last week, at a meeting of the IAEA's governing board in Vienna, Austria, U.S. Ambassador Jackie Sanders called attention to several areas in which Iran attempted to "hide, mislead and delay" the work of IAEA inspectors.

These include Iran's failure to allow follow-up inspection of Parchin, a high-explosives test facility identified by ABC News last September as a site at which U.S. officials believe Iran may be engaged in nuclear weapons-related research. She also cited Iran's continued construction of a heavy water research reactor, which could be used for the production of plutonium, and its failure to notify the IAEA plans to construct deep tunnels near Esfahan for the storage of nuclear materials until after the IAEA asked to inspect the site.