Trump trial: Biden calls Trump's remarks 'dangerous'

Judge Merchan again explained the legal theory at the center of the case.

Prosecutors allege that Trump falsified business records in order to hide a violation of New York election law.

"Under our law, a person is guilty of such a conspiracy when, with intent that conduct be performed that would promote or prevent the election of a person to public office by unlawful means, he or she agrees with one or more persons to engage in or cause the performance of such conduct," Merchan said.

Prosecutors offered three theories about the unlawful means: a tax crime, falsification of bank records, or campaign finance violations. The jury does not need to be unanimous about which theory they believe.

"Although you must conclude unanimously that the defendant conspired to promote or prevent the election of any person to a public office by unlawful means, you need not be unanimous as to what those unlawful means were," Merchan said.

In a social media post last night, Trump falsely claimed Judge Merchan was "not requiring a unanimous decision" in the case. Merchan reiterated that the jury does indeed need to be in full agreement about their verdict that Trump falsified business records in furtherance of another crime -- but they don't have to agree on which of the three proposed unlawful means were used to corrupt the election.

Trump, at the defense table, dozed off for a few minutes as Merchan continued his reread. Trump's head was resting on his chest. He then jolted up, shaking his head.

Judge Merchan reread the law on Count 1 against Trump.

"Under our law, a person is guilty of falsifying business records in the first degree when, with intent to defraud that includes an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof, that person makes or causes a false entry in the business records of an enterprise," he said.

He then read definitions of enterprise, business record, intent, and other terms used in the description.

Judge Merchan reread the portion of the instructions about Michael Cohen's testimony because he is an "accomplice" the in alleged crime.

This is a standard legal instruction about the testimony of an accomplice. Per the instructions, the jury cannot convict based solely on Cohen's testimony unless it is corroborated by evidence. If he testified about something to which there is no other evidence or testimony, the jury cannot convict on that testimony alone.

Those instructions read as follows:

Under our law, Michael Cohen is an accomplice because there is evidence that he participated in a crime based upon conduct involved in the allegations here against the defendant.

Our law is especially concerned about the testimony of an accomplice who implicates another in the commission of a crime, particularly when the accomplice has received, expects or hopes for a benefit in return for his testimony.

Therefore, our law provides that a defendant may not be convicted of any crime upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it is supported by corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of that crime.

In other words, even if you find the testimony of Michael Cohen to be believable, you may not convict the defendant solely upon that testimony unless you also find that it was corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.

The corroborative evidence need not, by itself, prove that a crime was committed or that the defendant is guilty. What the law requires is that there be evidence that tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged in such a way as may reasonably satisfy you that the accomplice is telling the truth about the defendant's participation in that crime.

In determining whether there is the necessary corroboration, you may consider whether there is material, believable evidence, apart from the testimony of Michael Cohen, which itself tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.

The jury reheard how to handle a witness who has been convicted of a crime -- also relevant to Michael Cohen.

"You are not required to reject the testimony of a witness who has been convicted of a crime or has engaged in criminal conduct, or to accept the testimony of a witness who has not," Judge Merchan said. "You may, however, consider whether a witness' criminal conviction or conduct has affected the truthfulness of the witness's testimony."